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CIVIL PROCEDURE: CLASS CERTIFICATION AND
THE PREDOMINANCE REQUIREMENT UNDER
OKLAHOMA SECTION 2023(B)(3)
STEVEN

S. GENSLER*

I. Introduction
Title 12, section 2023(B)(3) of the Oklahoma Statutes authorizes trial
courts to certify class actions in cases where the predominant questions of fact
or law to be litigated are common to the class members and class adjudication
is superior to the available alternatives.' While the section 2023(B)(3) class
action emphasizes the cohesiveness and sameness of the class members, its
primary goal is not consistency or uniformity, but ratherjudicial economy and
efficiency.2 It uses representative adjudication to relieve courts and parties
from having to litigate the same issues repeatedly and provides a cost-effective
way of affordingjustice when defendants systematically cause a small amount
of harm to a large number of people.'
This Article examines how Oklahoma courts are interpreting and applying
the predominance requirement for certifying section 2023(B)(3) class actions.
Admittedly, the topic is both too narrow and too broad. It is too narrow in the
sense that the various class certification standards - from the section
2023(A) prerequisites to the section 2023(B)(3) superiority requirement overlap with predominance at several points; thus, examining predominance
as a discrete topic suffers from a certain degree of inherent artificiality.4 On
* Associate Professor, University of Oklahoma College of Law. B.S.; J.D., 1992,
University of Illinois. I would like to thank Laura Hines and Patrick Woolley for reviewing an
earlier draft of this Article.
1. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023(B)(3) (2001).
2. See 5 JEROLD S. SOLOVY ET AL., MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 23.44 (3d ed. 2002)
[hereinafter MOORE'S FEDERALPRACTICE] (discussing categories ofclass actions under Federal

Rule of Civil Procedure 23); see also infra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
3. See 2 ALBERT CONTE &HERBERT NEWBERG, NEWBERG ON CLASS ACTIONS § 4:24, at
155 (4th ed. 2002) ("Rule 23(b)(3) was designed to permit a class action when judicial
economies could be achieved."); see also Mattoon v. City of Norman, 1981 OK 92, 9, 633
P.2d 735, 737 (stating that class actions were originally designed to provide redress for small
value claims, but later expanded to provide means of efficiently resolving large numbers of
overlapping claims).
4. Anyone wishing to comprehensively understand section 2023 will want to note the
larger body of recent decisions exploring class action practice in Oklahoma. See, e.g., Scoufos
v. State Farm Fire & Cas., 2001 OK 113,1 11, 41 P.3d 366, 370 (addressing prerequisite of
typicality); Fent v. Okla. Natural Gas Co., 2001 OK 35,1 15, 27 P.3d 477, 481-82 (same).
Also, many of the cases I discuss for their (B)(3) certification significance speak importantly to
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the other hand, an Article that purports to canvass the predominance
requirement is simultaneously too ambitious in its breadth; the predominance
requirement subsumes a wealth of issues that can vary significantly depending
on the subject matter underlying the putative class action.' Thus, I offer this
Article not as a comprehensive survey but as a selective and focused analysis
of a few of the more prominent issues emerging from the predominance
requirement. In so doing, my purpose is not to pass judgment on those
developments, but rather to identify them and to explore how they might
impact the future of section 2023(B)(3) class actions in Oklahoma.
To that end, this Article proceeds in six parts. Part II provides a brief
background on class actions, paying particular attention to the evolution of
class actions under Oklahoma state court procedure. Part I considers the
relationship between choice of law and the predominance requirement, a topic
that has become integral to a court's ability - and willingness - to certify
national state law class actions. Part IV then looks at how Oklahoma courts
are deciding challenges to predominance based on the presence of individual
issues. Here, I focus on two particular types of individual issues transactional variance and the need to prove individual reliance for fraud and
similar claims. Part V turns to the methodology that Oklahoma courts have
developed for determining whether common issues predominate over
individual issues. Important factors in this regard include how the trial court
may consider the merits at the certification stage, whether the trial court must
devise a plan for resolving individual issues prior to granting certification, and
the use of subclasses and issue classes to resolve problems of individual
issues. Part VI concludes with a few observations regarding the cumulative
effect of Oklahoma's approach to predominance and the significance of that
effect for Oklahoma's place in the national market for state law class actions.
11. Class Action Background
The class action is a procedural device that allows a representative plaintiff
to sue on behalf of himself and others who are similarly situated.6 Class
actions serve several purposes. First, class actions promote economy and
other class action issues. See, e.g., Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2003 OK 17, U 28-32,
No. 97,469, 2003 WL 437160, at *7-*8 (Feb. 25, 2003) (addressing prerequisite of
representativeness); KMC Leasing, Inc. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 2000 OK 51, U 15-18,
28-30, 9 P.3d 683, 691-92 (addressing prerequisites of numerosity and typicality).
5. As of this date, the published Oklahoma class action decisions primarily relate to
business and consumer disputes. Accordingly, this Article emphasizes those areas in its
discussion of section 2023(B)(3), particularly in Part IV, which deals with the impact of
individual issues on predominance.
6. 1 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 1:1.
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efficiency "by obviating the need for multiple adjudications of the same
issues." 7 Second, class actions promote consistency by ensuring that similarly
situated plaintiffs are treated alike, and by ensuring that defendants are not
subject to conflicting orders.8 Third, class actions promote justice by
affording a viable remedy for plaintiffs with small individual claims who
otherwise could not economically pursue their rights.9
In Oklahoma, class actions are governed by title 12, section 2023 of the
Oklahoma Statutes. ° Section 2023 is modeled after Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23," the only significant current 12 difference being that section
7. 5 MOORE'S FEDERALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 23.02; see also Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon,
457 U.S. 147, 155 (1982) ("'[T]he class action device saves the resources of both the courts and
the parties by permitting an issue potentially affecting every [class member] to be litigated in
an economical fashion ....')(alteration in original) (quoting Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S.
682, 701 (1979)).
8. See 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 23.02.
9. See id.; see also Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 809 (1985) ("Class
actions . . .permit the plaintiffs to pool claims which would be uneconomical to litigate
individually."); Ysbrand, 6, 2003 WL 437160, at *2 ("The [class action device] permits
plaintiffs to 'vindicat[e] the rights of individuals who otherwise might not consider it worth the
candle to embark on litigation in which the optimum result might be more than consumed by
the cost.") (alteration in original) (quoting Deposit Guar. Nat'l Bank v. Roper, 445 U.S. 326,
338 (1980)).
10. The Oklahoma legislature adopted section 2023 in 1984 as part of the Oklahoma
Pleading Code. See generally Charles W. Adams, Highlights of Changes Made by the
Oklahoma PleadingCode, 55 OKLA. B.J. 1875, 1876 (1984). Section 2023 superseded two
prior Oklahoma class action rules. Oklahoma's first class action rule - commonly referred to
as "section 233" - was based on the Field Code. See George B. Fraser, Kinds of ClassAction
Cases, 7 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 1, 22 (1982) (discussing former rule). In 1978, Oklahoma
enacted another class action statute modeled after New York's class action statute. Id. at 26.
The operative provision was title 12, section 13A, which effectively merged the current section
2023(A) prerequisites and the current section 2023(B)(3) predominance and superiority
requirements such that all class actions brought under 13A had to demonstrate predominance
and superiority, even those class actions that today would proceed under current section
2023(B)(1) or (B)(2). See id.; Allen Wayne Campbell, Annual Survey of Oklahoma Law,
Pleadingand Procedure,6 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 751, 754 (1981) (discussing former section
13A). Significantly, the 1978 class action rule also required class members to "opt in" to the
class, in contrast to current section 2023(B)(3), which binds class members to the class
judgment unless they "opt out." See Adams, supra, at 1876; Fraser, supra, at 27.
11. FED. R. Civ.P. 23.
12. On March 27,2003, the United States Supreme Court submitted proposed amendments
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See Amendments Transmitted to Congress (Mar. 2003),
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/congressO303.html (last visited Sept. 10, 2003). The amendments, which will take effect December 1, 2003, absent contrary congressional action, include
significant new requirements relating to class action settlement and the appointment and
compensation of class counsel. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 (Proposed 2003), available at http:II
www.uscourts.gov/rules/congress0303.html.
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2023 contains an additional provision dealing with the notice that class
representatives must provide to absent class members. 3 Accordingly,
Oklahoma courts may look to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and the
decisions interpreting it for guidance. 4
Under section 2023, a judge must certify the case as a class action before
the representative plaintiff may litigate on behalf of the class. 5 The
certification process has two steps. First, the putative class representative
must show that a sufficiently defined and cohesive class of plaintiffs exists.
The putative class representative does this by showing that the class meets the
section 2023(A) "prerequisites" to a class action: numerosity, commonality,
typicality, and representativeness. 6 Second, a putative class representative
13. See 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2023 & comm. cmt. (West 1993). In addition, Federal Rule
ofCivil Procedure 23 was amended in 1998 to add a provision allowing for interlocutory appeal
ofclass certification rulings. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(f) advisory committee's note (1998). While
Oklahoma also allows for interlocutory appeal of class certification rulings, that provision is
located at title 12, section 993(A)(6) of the Oklahoma Statutes. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 993(A)(6)
(2001).
14. The Committee Comment to section 2023 expressly states: "In construing Section 2023
Oklahoma courts should consult the Advisory Notes to the 1966 amendments to Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 23." 12 OKLA. STAT. ANN. § 2023 comm. cmt. (West 1993). In addition,
the Oklahoma Supreme Court has stated that "[s]ince Oklahoma's class action scheme closely
parallels that provided in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, we may look to federal authority
for guidance regarding its rationale." KMC Leasing, Inc. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 2000 OK
51, 9, 9 P.3d 683, 688 (citing Shores v. First City Bank Corp., 1984 OK 67, 1 5, 689 P.2d
299, 301). Oklahoma courts have sought guidance from federal class action decisions since
1978, when Oklahoma first adopted a class action rule that paralleled federal class action
practice under the modem (post 1966) version of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23. See Perry
v. Meek, 1980 OK 151, 1 19, 618 P.2d 934, 940 ("The Federal Rule 23(a) class action
prerequisites closely track the class action prerequisites given in [title 12, section 13 of the
Oklahoma Statutes]. Insofar as the issues under consideration arise from provisions of title 12,
sections 13 through 18, which are actually similar to the provisions of Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 23, the federal case law on those points is instructive persuasive authority in this
forum.").
15. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023 (2001). The certification process helps ensure that the class
action ultimately yields a judgment binding on the class members. See Amchem Prods., Inc.
v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 621 (1997) ("Subdivisions (a) and (b) focus court attention on
whether a proposed class has sufficient unity so that absent members can fairly be bound by
decisions of class representatives."). Absent class members are bound by the judgment only
"where they are in fact adequately represented by parties who are present." Hansberry v. Lee,
311 U.S. 32, 43 (1940). For a discussion of the ability of absent class members to collaterally
attack class judgements based on the adequacy of representation, see Patrick Woolley, The
Availabilityof CollateralAttack for InadequateRepresentationin ClassSuits, 79 TEx. L. REV.
383, 384 (2000).
16. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023(A) (2001). The class must also be ascertainable based on
objective characteristics that are not dependent on the outcome of the suit. See 5 MOORE's
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 23.21[4]; see also, e.g., Intratex Gas Co. v. Beeson, 22
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who satisfies the prerequisites must show that the lawsuit he proposes to bring
fits within one of three categories of cases in which class actions are deemed
maintainable: (1) where separate suits by the individual class members would
create a risk that the defendant would become subject to inconsistent
obligations, or that the outcomes of certain class members' suits would
substantially impair the rights of the other class members; (2) where the suit
is principally to obtain injunctive or declaratory relief; or (3) where the class
members' common issues predominate over their individual issues and class
treatment would be superior to other methods of adjudication. 7 This Article
focuses on the last category - the so-called "(b)(3)" class action."8 More
specifically, it focuses on the predominance requirement under section
2023(B)(3) - that "the questions of law or fact common to the members of
the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual
members." 9
The purpose of the predominance requirement is to ensure that proceeding
as a (b)(3) class action in fact will promote judicial economy and efficiency.2"
S.W.3d 398,402-03 (Tex. 2000) (finding that the class of persons "whose natural gas was taken
by the defendant in quantities less than their ratable proportions" impermissibly defined the
class per ultimate liability issue).
17. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023(B) (2001).
18. In this Article, I use the term "(b)(3)" to generically refer to class actions brought under
the type of predominance and superiority criteria found in section 2023, the parallel Federal
Rule of Civil Procedure 23, and other similar state rules governing class actions. See, e.g., TEX.
R. Civ. P. 42(b)(4) (authorizing class certification under predominance and superiority
standards). See generally 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 13.1.
19. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023(B)(3) (2001). This Article does not specifically address the
additional requirement that class treatment be superior to alternative forms of adjudication. See,
e.g., Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2003 OK 17,1124-25, No. 97,469,2003 WL437160,
at *6 (Feb. 25, 2003) (concluding that class action was superior to separate suits by individual
minivan owners). Overlap certainly exists; the manageability of the proposed class actions is
one of the primary considerations for finding superiority, and the presence of large numbers of
individual issues can cause significant management problems.
See Sias v. Edge
Communications, Inc., 2000 OK CIV APP 72, 1 10, 8 P.3d 182, 185 ("The difficulty in
managing a class action is a factor to be considered in determining whether a class action is the
superior method of adjudication."). As one leading treatise explains, "When a court determines
that common questions do not predominate over individual ones ...the court is highly likely
to find that a class action is also not superior because of the management difficulties posed by
the individual questions." 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 4:32, at 283; see also 5
MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 23.49[5][b]. Superiority, however, also looks
to factors that do not overlap with predominance, such as the interest individual class members
might have in controlling their own suits, overlap with pending litigation, and the
appropriateness of the particular forum for consolidated litigation. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3);
12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023(B)(3) (2001). For a more extended discussion of the superiority
requirement, see 2 CoNTE & NEWBERG, supra note 3, §§ 4:27-4:32.
20. See FED. R. CIV. P. 23 advisory committee's note (1966) ("Subdivision (b)(3)
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It is not always clear how a court is to determine this, however, since the rule
does not define predominance 2 and the courts have not articulated a single
precise standard for measuring predominance." Courts universally reject a
numerical test in the sense that predominance is not determined by comparing
the sheer number of common issues with the number of individual issues.
It also cannot be measured by simply comparing how much trial time would
be needed for common issues versus individual issues.2 4 Rather, courts view
predominance as a qualitative analysis that focuses on the overall significance
encompasses those cases in which a class action would achieve economies of time, effort, and
expense, and promote uniformity of decision as to persons similarly situated, without sacrificing
procedural fairness or bringing about other undesirable results."); 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra
note 3, § 4:25, at 156. The predominance requirement may serve the additional purpose of
"test[ing] whether proposed classes are sufficiently cohesive to warrant adjudication by
representation." Amchem Prods., Inc., v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 623 (1997). But see John
Coffee, Jr., ClassActionAccountability:ReconcilingExit, Voice, andLoyalty in Representative
Litigation, 100 COLUM. L. REv. 370, 400-02 (2000) (arguing that predominance cannot be
understood as a function of class cohesion).
21. See 7A CHARLEs A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 1778, at
522-26 (2d ed. 1986) ("Exactly what is meant by 'predominate' is not made clear in the
rule ....
").Rule 23(b)(3), both in its federal and Oklahoma forms, does add the following:
The matters pertinent to the findings include: (a) the interest of members of the
class in individually controlling the prosecution or defense of separate actions, (b)
the extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class, (c) the desirability or
undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claims in the particular forum,
and (d) the difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class
action.
FED. R. CIv. P. 23(b)(3); 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023(B)(3) (2001). While these factors technically
apply to both predominance and superiority, they are most commonly viewed as speaking to the
issue of superiority. See 2 CONTE &NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 4:28; see also 7A WRIGHT ET
AL., supra, § 1777, at 519-20 ("To aid the court in determining whether class action treatment
would be superior, subdivision (b)(3) lists four factors that the court should consider ... )
(citation omitted).
22. 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 23.46[ 1] (listing various standards
courts have employed). Oftentimes, statements about predominance seem to beg the question
being asked. See, e.g., KMC Leasing, Inc. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 2000 OK 51, 19, 9
P.3d 683,690 ("Where a litany of individual issues is presented, the crucial element of the test
is whether those very questions preclude the common from being predominant.").
23. See KMC Leasing, 119,9 P.3d at 690 (finding that predominance is not quantitative);
see also 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 4.25, at 172 ("[Plredominance requirement is
not a numerical test.").
24. See 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 4:25, at 171. This type of"clockwatching"
is not a helpful measurement because it ignores all of the time saved by not having to litigate
the common issue over and over. See 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supranote 21, § 1778, at 527. Indeed,
if anything, the "clockwatching" approach penalizes the judicial economy of class adjudication
of the common issue.
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and weight of the common issues relative to the individual issues.25 While this
conceptualization is certainly more meaningful than counting issues or trial
hours, it also is more subjective and less predictable.26
IlL. Predominanceand Choice of Law
Choice-of-law principles play a crucial role in the certification of (b)(3)
class actions, particularly when the class consists of persons living in many
different states.27 Numerous federal and state courts have held that common
issues do not predominate over individual issues when the laws of multiple
states will apply to different class members. 2' This view grows out of the
belief that, if the laws of different states will apply to the claims of the various
class members, then variations in the different states' laws "may swamp any
common issues and defeat predominance., 29 Thus, a plaintiff who must
prosecute his class action under the laws of multiple states faces a difficult -

25. See KMC Leasing, 1 19,9 P.3d at 690; Mattoon v. City of Norman, 1981 OK 92, 18,
633 P.2d 735, 739 ("Predominance is a qualitative rather than quantitative matter because
weight of issues may outweigh their number."); see also Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 306 F.3d
1247, 1252 (2d Cir. 2002) ("Class-wide issues predominate if resolution of some of the legal
or factual questions that qualify each class member's case as a genuine controversy can be
achieved through generalized proof, and if these particular issues are more substantial than the
issues subject only to individualized proof.").
26. See 2 CoNTE & NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 4.25, at 172-73 (criticizing comparison of
the relative importance of common versus individual issues as subjective and unpredictable).
27. See Rory Ryan, Note, Uncertifiable?: The CurrentStatus of Nationwide State-Law
Class Actions, 54 BAYLOR L. REV. 467, 474 (2002) ("[C]hoice-of-law inquiry will ordinarily
make or break certification."); see also Paul W. Sugarman et al., Choice-of-Law Analysis May
Stem Class Actions: Class CertificationsOften Turn on Inconsistenciesin the Applicable Law,
NAT'L L.J., Sept. 16, 2002, at B 11 ("A pivotal issue in deciding whether to certify [national
class actions] is whether the court can and should apply the laws of a single jurisdiction to all
members of the class, or whether class members' claims must be governed by the laws of their
home states.").
28. According to one recent decision, "[s]tate and federal courts have overwhelmingly
rejected class certification when multiple states' laws must be applied." Henry Schein, Inc. v.
Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675,698-99 (Tex. 2002) (citations omitted) (collecting federal and state
cases). Indeed, the Seventh Circuit recently went so far as to say that "[n]o class action is
proper unless all litigants are governed by the same legal rules." In re Bridgestone/Firestone,
Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002). For additional case references, see Ryan, supranote
27, at 470-71 (listing federal and state cases).
29. Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 741 (5th Cir. 1996). As the Sixth Circuit
explained, "If more than a few of the laws of the fifty states differ, the district judge would face
an impossible task of instructing a jury on the relevant law .... In re Am. Med. Sys., 75 F.3d
1069, 1085 (6th Cir. 1996).
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though not impossible - task of persuading the court that the resulting class
action would be manageable.3"
Decisions from Oklahoma courts demonstrate the importance of choice of
law for class certification. When Oklahoma courts have concluded that they
would be obligated to apply the laws of different states to different class
members, they have consistently found that common issues did not
predominate and have denied class certification.3 On the other hand,
30. Some courts have granted class certification even when the laws of all fifty states will
apply by finding that the different states' laws can be "grouped" into a manageable handful of
categories and then subclassed under Rule 23(c)(4)(B). See, e.g., In re St. Jude Med., Inc.
Silzone Heart Valves Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 01-1396 JRT/FLN, 2003 WL 1589527, at
*10 (D. Minn. Mar. 27, 2003) (creating subclasses based on states with similar laws); In re
Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271, 294 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (finding that subclasses
adequately accounted for the relevant differences in state law); see also Mary J.Davis, Toward
the ProperRole for Mass Tort Class Actions, 77 OR. L. REV. 157, 219-23 (1998) (expressing
view that tort laws are sufficiently similar to allow groupings); Larry Kramer, Choice of Law
in Complex Litigation, 71 N.Y.U. L. REv. 547, 583 (1996) (suggesting that, in practice, there
will usually only be three or four formulations for any legal principle); Ryan Patrick Phair,
Comment, Resolving the "Choice-of-Law Problem" in Rule 23(b)(3) Nationwide ClassActions,
67 U. CHI. L. REv. 835,854-56 (2000) (advocating use of grouping and subclassing to deal with
state law variation). Other courts, however, have been skeptical that state laws can be grouped
in a way that preserves the subtle but important differences in the laws of the various states.
See, e.g., In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293, 1300 (7th Cir. 1995) (rejecting
groupings approach because even if state laws differed only in nuance, that "nuance can be
important"); In re Paxil Litig., 212 F.R.D. 539, 545 (C.D. Cal. 2003) (rejecting proposed
groupings as failing to deal adequately with material differences in state laws); Adams v. Kansas
City Life Ins. Co., 192 F.R.D. 274, 278 (W.D. Mo. 2000) (finding that plaintiffs state law
tables failed to address divergent elements of various state laws); In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition
Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 350 (D.N.J. 1997) (finding that plaintiffs failed to
demonstrate that state laws could be grouped sufficiently to warrant class certification); Tracker
Marine, L.P. v. Ogle, 108 S.W.3d 349, 360 (Tex. App. 2003) (rejecting use of subgroups
because "it is unlikely any lawyer or judge could grasp the shades and nuances of so many
laws"); see also Arthur R. Miller & David Crump, Jurisdictionand Choice of Law in Multistate
Class Actions After Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 96 YALE L.J. 1, 65 (1986) (describing
solution of grouping apparently similar laws as tempting but one that creates enormous pressure
on judges to compromise important differences in the laws of the various states). I discuss the
practical impact of subclassing by law groupings infra Part V.
31. See Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2003 OK 17, 1 18, No. 97,469, 2003 WL
437160, at * 5 (Feb. 25, 2003) ("Applying the law of 51 jurisdictions to the fraud claim presents
an overwhelming burden which would make the class unmanageable and a class action
determination of that claim inappropriate."); KMC Leasing, Inc. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp.,
2000 OK 51, 126,9 P.3d 683,691 ("Proof regarding liability and damages will require the trial
court to analyze fraud issues under differing laws of numerous jurisdictions. Thus, individuality
of issues will predominate. ... "); Conatzer v. Am. Mercury Ins. Co., 2000 OK CIV APP 141,
I1 25-27, 15 P.3d 1252, 1258 (affirming denial of class certification in part because the claims
of the class members might be governed by different states' laws); Sias v. Edge
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Oklahoma courts have also rejected predominance and superiority objections
after finding that, under Oklahoma conflict principles, a single state's law
would govern all claims.32
The Oklahoma Supreme Court's most recent section 2023(B)(3) class
action case, Ysbrand v. DaimlerChryslerCorp., vividly illustrates the impact
of choice of law on class certification. 3 The plaintiffs in Ysbrand sought to
certify a nationwide class action consisting of all persons in the United States
who had purchased a 1996-97 model year Chrysler, Dodge, or Plymouth
minivan. 3 The principal class claims were that the front passenger-seat air
bags in these minivans were defective, and that DaimlerChrysler withheld
information regarding the air bags' defects from minivan purchasers.3" The
putative class complaint asserted claims for breach of express warranty,
breach of implied warranty of merchantability, breach of implied warranty of
fitness, and fraud. 6 The Sequoyah County District Court certified the class
as to all of these claims after finding that the substantive law of Michigan DaimlerChrysler's principal place of business - would apply to all of the
claims of all of the class members. 7
On appeal, one ofDaimlerChrysler's principal arguments was that common
issues could not predominate because the laws of different states would apply
to different class members.3" The Oklahoma Supreme Court began its analysis
with the breach of warranty claims. The court first reaffirmed that Oklahoma

Communications, Inc., 2000 OK CIV APP 72, 11 19-20, 8 P.3d 182, 189 (same); Bunch v.
KMart Corp., 1995 OK CIV APP 41,11 7-9, 898 P.2d 170, 172 (reversing class certification
in part because the claims of the class members would be governed by different states' laws).
32. See Ysbrand, 16, 2003 WL 437160, at *4 (affirming class certification of warranty
claims after finding that Michigan law governed all class members' warranty claims); Lobo
Exploration Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 1999 OK CIV APP 112, 13, 991 P.2d 1048, 1054
(affirming class certification after finding that the defendant had failed to show that any law
other than Oklahoma law would apply to any class member).
33. As of September 7, 2003, the Oklahoma Supreme Court had not released Ysbrand for
publication in the permanent law reports. Thus, it is still subject to revision or withdrawal. See
Ysbrand, 2003 OK 17, 2003 WL 437160. The Appellant's Petition for Rehearing, filed March
18, 2003, is also still pending. The court docket for Ysbrand is available online at the
Oklahoma State Courts Network at http://www.oscn.net.
34. Ysbrand, 4, 2003 WL 437160, at *1. There were several exclusions from the class,
most notably all persons who had suffered personal injury as a result of the actual deployment
of the minivan's air bag. Id. 4, 2003 WL 437160, at *2. Even with the exclusions, the
estimated class size exceeded one million. Id. 1 2, 2003 WL 437160, at *1.
35. Id.13,2003 WL437160,at *1.
36. Id. 2,2003 WL437160, at *1.
37. Id. I 9-11, 2003 WL 437160, at *3.
38. Id. 8, 2003 WL 437160, at *2.
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follows the "most significant relationship" test developed in the Restatement
(Second) of Conflicts.3 9 The court then acknowledged that, in cases involving
the sale of goods, the Second Restatement presumptively chooses the law of
the place of delivery as having the most significant relationship to the suit.4"
Nevertheless, presumptions under the Second Restatement are rebuttable upon
a finding that another state has a more significant relationship as determined
by the overarching choice of law principles set forth in section 6 of the Second
Restatement. 4 In Ysbrand, the court invoked the section 6 principles to rebut
the presumption running to the place of delivery and instead found that
Michigan was the state with the most significant relationship.4 2 Thus,
Michigan warranty law would apply to all of the class warranty claims,
regardless of where the buyer-class member lived.43 Having found that only
one set of laws would apply to the warranty claims, the court rejected the
argument that the need to apply multiple laws would preclude class
certification of the warranty claims.'
The court then turned to the class claims for fraud and misrepresentation.
Here, the court found that Second Restatement principles presumptively
selected the law of each class member's domicile because that is where,
through the purchase of a minivan, the class members relied on
DaimlerChrysler's alleged misrepresentations.4 5 As the court correctly noted,
in cases involving pecuniary damages for false representations, section 148 of
the Second Restatement provides that the local law of the state where the
buyer relied applies "unless, with respect to the particular issue, some other
state has a more significant relationship under the principles stated in [section]
6.-46 In other words, section 148 employs standard Second Restatement
39. Id. 12, 2003 WL 437160, at *3.
40. Id. 113,2003 WL437160, at *3-*4 (discussing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONFLICTS

§ 191 (1971)).
41. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONFLICTS § 6 (1971). For a discussion of the Second
Restatement's use of rebuttable presumptions, see EUGENE F. SCOLES ET AL., CONFLICT OFLAWS
§ 2.14, at 62 (3d ed. 2000).
42. Ysbrand, 116, 2003 WL 437160, at *4. The court concluded that the buyer's home
state had a diminished interest, even though it would be the place of contracting, performance,
and delivery, because car buyers do not negotiate automobile warranties. Id. 15, 2003 WL
437160, at *4. On the other hand, it concluded that Michigan had a strong interest in applying
its own warranty law, because it was the place where the minivan was designed and

manufactured. Id.
43. Id.

16, 2003 WL 437160, at *4.

44. Id.
45. Id. IN 17-18,2003 WL 437160, at *5 (applying RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OFCONFLICTS
§ 148 (1971)).
46. Id. 1 17 n.6, 2003 WL 437160, at *5 n.6 (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICTS § 148 (1971)).
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methodology by creating a rebuttable presumption to be tested against the
broad section 6 analysis. The Ysbrand opinion, however, omits any such
discussion. Therefore, with the section 148 presumption standing unrebutted,
the court held that the law of each class member's home state would govern
the class fraud claims.4 7 Concluding that class treatment when so many laws
would apply would be unmanageable, the court decertified the class fraud
claims.4 8
While Ysbrandis certainly notable for its outcome, its greatest significance
may lie in its methodology. The Oklahoma Supreme Court gave three
principal reasons for finding that Michigan had the most significant
relationship to the warranty dispute. The first reason was that Michigan's
interest, as the place of design and manufacture, was stronger than the interest
of the states where the minivans were sold because manufacturer warranties
are not negotiated.4 9 The second was that Michigan's interest is greatest
because, while the buyers' home states could only have an interest in applying
their law to their own citizens' respective transactions, Michigan had an
interest in applying its law to all of the class members' transactions because
every transaction involved a Michigan actor-defendant.50 Third, the court
noted that applying Michigan law (as the state with the greatest contacts and
interest) to all claims would further other Second Restatement policies, such
as the needs of the interstate system, predictability, and uniformity of result,
by determining the issue of product defect "in one forum with one result."'"
What makes this analysis so tantalizing is that the second and third reasons
approach choice of law not from the perspective of the individual class
members or their claims,5 2 but from the perspective of the class action as a
47. Id. 118, 2003 WL437160, at *5.
48. Id.
49. Id. 1 15, 2003 WL 437160, at *4.This assertion, of course, assumes that the seller
made no additional representations regarding the airbags during the course of the sale. See
generally, U.C.C. § 2-313 (1989) (stating that promises made by seller about the goods during
a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods). On a more fundamental level,
defining a state's interest based on the absence of actual negotiation of terms denotes a limited
view of what makes a state "interested" for purposes of choice of law. Under conventional
interest analysis, a state is "interested" if it has a policy underlying its law that would be
furthered by applying that law in that case. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 41, § 2.14, at 27.
Using such a standard, the various class members' home states almost certainly would view
themselves as "interested" on the basis that warranty laws serve the purpose of protecting
consumers and regulating commerce - policies that would be furthered by applying home state
warranty law to transactions that took place within those states regardless of whether the buyers
ever looked at the warranty materials.
50. Ysbrand 15, 2003 WL 437160, at *4.
51. Id. 16, 2003 WL 437160, at *4.
52. Many courts caution that a proper choice-of-law analysis cannot be done by generically
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whole. In other words, the court appears to have chosen lawfor the class, as
a class.53
Whether a court decides choice of law on an individual class member basis
or for the class as a whole can have enormous consequences. Imagine that one
of the class members lives in Norman, Oklahoma and purchased his minivan
at the local Chrysler dealership. Had he sued DaimlerChrysler on his own, it
seems very unlikely that any Oklahoma court would have displaced
presumptively applicable Oklahoma law in favor of Michigan law.54 Indeed,
the reasons for displacing Oklahoma law in the Ysbrand class action - the
fact that Oklahoma did not have an interest in regulating out of state
transactions and the benefits of having a single law apply - would not even
comparing the interests of one state (such as the defendant's home state) with the law of all
other potentially interested states, but rather must involve inquiring into the applicability of each
state's law on a state-by-state basis. See, e.g., Spence v. Glock, 227 F.3d 308, 312 (5th Cir.
2000) (holding that courts may not make wholesale choice-of-law conclusions but instead must
make choice-of-law decisions by comparing the contacts and interests of all implicated states);
Gyarmathy & Assocs., Inc. v. TIG Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 3:02-CV-1245, 2003 WL 21339279,
at *1-2 (N.D. Tex. June 3,2003) (choice of law is determined for each class member, not classwide); see also Zinser v. Accufix Research Inst., Inc., 253 F.3d 1180, 1188 (9th Cir. 2001)
(requiring class counsel that argued that the defendant's home state law would apply in national
class action to apply California's interest analysis test to each state with an interest in the
application of its own law), amended by 273 F.3d 1266 (9th Cir. 2001). A particularly apt
example of this philosophy is found in In re Ford Motor Co. Bronco II Product Liability
Litigation, 177 F.R.D. 360 (E.D. La. 1997), in which the district court rejected class counsel's
argument that Michigan law applied to all of the class's fraud and warranty claims because that
was where Ford made its allegedly defective product and then concealed the defect. In re Ford
Motor Co., 177 F.R.D. at 370-71. The court stated that "[w]hat is required is a comparative
analysis of Michigan law and the law and policies of each state with which the claim has
contacts." Id. at 370; see also Chin v. Chrysler Corp., 182 F.R.D. 448, 457 (D.N.J. 1998)
("While it might be desirable for the sake of efficiency to settle upon one state, such as New
Jersey, and apply its law in lieu of the other 49 jurisdictions, due process requires individual
consideration of the choice of law issues raised by each class member's case before
certification."); In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab. Litig., 174 F.R.D. 332, 348
(D.N.J. 1997) (same).
53. The Oklahoma Supreme Court's methodology may find some grounding from the
Second Restatement. For contract issues where there is no contractual choice-of-law provision,
section 188 selects the law of the state with "the most significant relationship to the transaction
and the parties." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS § 188(1) (1971) (emphasis added).
One can read Ysbrand as simply equating the class action with the "transaction and the parties,"
and then concluding that Michigan had "the most significant relationship to the class action."
54. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1018 (7th Cir. 2002)
(rejecting the plaintiff's request for the application of either Michigan or Tennessee law to all
of the class members' claims after finding that "Indiana has consistently said that sales of
products in Indiana must conform to Indiana's consumer-protection laws and its rules of
contract law.").
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be present in a suit brought by a single Oklahoma plaintiff. Thus, if the
Ysbrand case stands as decided, then the Oklahoma class members in Ysbrand
will have their warranty claims decided under a different law in the class
action than they would have had as individual litigants.55
This is not to say that Ysbrand is wrongly decided. Most fundamentally,56
choice-of-law principles are questions of state law and state policy.
Conflicts regimes like the Second Restatement become "law" only when
adopted by a state, and then serve only as a template, which the state may
modify at the time of adoption or through judicial interpretation.57 Thus,
Ysbrand is, by definition, a correct articulation and application of Oklahoma
conflicts principles. So long as the end results satisfy the minimum
requirement of the U.S. Constitution - that the state whose law is chosen has
a "significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts" with the claims
asserted - the states may adopt and modify choice-of-law principles as they
see fit. 58 Whatever else may be said about Ysbrand, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court's policy decision to resolve warranty claims pursuant to the law of the
manufacturer's home state satisfies this constitutional requirement.
Nor is it my current assertion that Ysbrand is normatively indefensible. To
the extent that class structure is now an important factor under Oklahoma

55. The same may well be true for class members from other states. Assume, for example,
that a Texas resident who bought a Chrysler minivan in Dallas later sued DaimlerChrysler in
Oklahoma state court. Oklahoma choice-of-law principles would still yield the presumption that
Texas warranty law would apply. Here too, the reasons the Ysbrand court identified for
displacing the law of the place of delivery would not apply. Thus, just like the Oklahoma
minivan buyer, the Texas minivan buyer would receive a different warranty law as a class
member (Michigan) than he would have received as an individual litigant (Texas).
56. See Kramer, supranote 30, at 569-72 (explaining why choice-of-law principles reflect
policy choices that are "as substantive as it gets").
57. See SCOLES ET AL., supra note 41, § 2.19 (discussing state adoption of conflicts rules
and cautioning the use of labels because of variations in adoption and practice). For a
discussion of how the states have selectively adopted and modified the Second Restatement
conflicts principles, see Patrick J. Borchers, Courtsand the Second Conflicts Restatement: Some
Observations and an EmpiricalNote, 56 MD. L. REv. 1232, 1240-41 (1997). In stating that
courts may modify conflicts principles through their judicial interpretation, I assume that any
such modification is consistent with any overriding state statutory guidance on the choice of law
in that context. Ysbrand itself is one such case, as the Second Restatement principles it sets
forth operate within the ambit of the Oklahoma Commercial Code. Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler
Corp., 1 12, No. 97,469, 2003 WL 437160, at *3 (Feb. 25, 2003) (citing Collins Radio Co. v.
Bell, 1980 OK CIV APP 57, 118, 623 P.2d 1039, 1046-47).
58. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 312-13 (1981) ("[Flor a State's
substantive law to be selected in a constitutionally permissible manner, that State must have a
significant contact or significant aggregation of contacts, creating state interests, such that
choice of its law is neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair.").
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conflicts law,59 there is support for that approach. A decade ago, the
American Law Institute recommended that Congress adopt federal choice-oflaw rules specifically designed to select a single state's law for complex
litigation in federal court.6" The reasons given for doing so - "to maximize
the efficient handling of the litigation, as well as encourage consistent
results" 61 - parallel the reasons given by the Oklahoma Supreme Court in
Ysbrand for displacing the law of the place of delivery and choosing Michigan
warranty law for all class members.62 This approach has been sharply
criticized by Professor Kramer, who forcefully argues that courts should use
the same choice-of-law methodology for class actions that they use for
individual suits precisely to ensure that an individual's rights are not
determined by whether he is an individual litigant or a class member.63 While
I am presently inclined to Professor Kramer's viewpoint for a variety
of reasons,' I do not dispute that courts could greatly facilitate class
59. That the class action context played a role in the choice of warranty law seems
undeniable. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text. It would be premature, however,
to say that Oklahoma conflicts principles vary based on class structure in all cases. Indeed, one
of the puzzlements of Ysbrand is that, while Michigan was also the only state that had an
interest in applying its fraud law to all of the claims, and while resolving all of the fraud claims
in one suit under one law would have fostered uniformity of result, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court did not even hint at rebutting the Second Restatement presumption running to the law of
the place of purchase for the fraud claims.
60. See AM. LAWINST., COMPLEXLITIGATIONPROJECT, introductory note, at 389 (Proposed
Final Draft, 1993) [hereinafter COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT] ("[Tihe third and final
underlying premise for this Chapter's choice of law rules is that it would be highly desirable if
a single state's law could be applied to a particular issue that is common to all the claims and
parties involved in the litigation."). The Complex Litigation Project's proposed choice-of-law
rules sought a single state's law both for mass tort cases, including mass fraud, see id. § 6.01 (a),
and mass contracts, see id. § 6.03(a). For more comprehensive analysis of the Complex
Litigation Project, see Symposium, American Law Institute Complex LitigationProject,54 LA.
L. REv. 833 (1994).
61. COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 60, at 389; see also id. § 6.01 cmt. c, at 419
("[Tihe application of this section's standards may foster the consolidated handling of the
litigation."); id. § 6.03 cmt. a, at 459 ("'he need to apply a uniform law to govern claims being
asserted under what are essentially identical or similar contracts is supported by the desire to
allow the consolidation of multiple, repetitive claims and by the policy of treating parties who
are in similar positions alike.").
62. See Ysbrand, i 15-16, 2003 WL 437160, at *4 (factors).
63. See, e.g., Kramer, supra note 30, at 576. The ALI's Complex Litigation Project
acknowledged that its proposed choice-of-law rules would effect "a disparity in treatment"
based on case structure and joinder, but felt that "the need to achieve justice among the litigants
by assuring the uniform and economical treatment of their dispute justifies this difference." See
COMPLEX LITIGATION PROJECT, supra note 60, at 379.
64. At the most basic level, Professor Kramer's approach best comports with my view that
class actions are aggregations of individuals rather than entities unto themselves. Compare
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adjudication by adopting conflicts principles that take note of the litigation
structure.65
But whatever one might think of Ysbrand's choice-of-law ruling for the
class warranty claims from a normative perspective, its practical significance
is beyond question. The plaintiffs' bar has a well-earned reputation for
gravitating towards forums that are the most hospitable to class actions.66 Few
would disagree that plaintiffs' class counsel would prefer a forum whose
choice-of-law rules facilitate class certification by selecting the law of a single
state for the claims of all class members. 67 At a minimum, the Ysbrand
decision presumptively tells trial judges in both the Oklahoma state court
Coffee, supra note 20, at 385 (rejecting entity theory) with David L. Shapiro, ClassActions: The
Class as Party and Client, 73 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 913, 918-19 (1998) (advocating entity
theory). At a more specific level, jurisdictions that choose law for the class necessarily
subordinate the claims of some class members to the claims of others, at least unless the law
chosen is the most advantageous law available to any class member. See Coffee, supra note 20,
at 387 (noting that differences in the applicable law can affect claim values drastically, perhaps
to the point of requiring subclasses); see also Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675,
695-96 (Tex. 2002) (discussing how choice of Texas law for all class members would benefit
class members from some state but hurt class members from other states). That sin, however,
may be one committed by the class representative and class counsel rather than the forum.
Professor Woolley examines the relationship between choice of law and adequacy of
representation in much greater depth in an upcoming article. Patrick Woolley, Choice of Law
and the Certification of Mass Tort Class Actions Under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(b)(3) (draft manuscript, on file with author).
65. It should be noted that much of the criticism in this area is directed at cases where a
federal judge has manipulated general state conflicts principles in order to find that the law of
a single state applied, thereby facilitating class certification. See Kramer, supra note 30, at 552
(discussing examples); see also Scott Fruehwald, Individual Justice in Mass Tort Litigation:
Judge Jack B. Weinstein on Choice of Law in Mass Tort Cases, 31 HOFSTRA L. REV. 323, 348
(2002) (discussing manipulation of New York choice-of-law principles to apply New York law
to national tobacco class action). While Klaxon Co. v. Stentor ElectricManufacturingCo., 313
U.S. 487 (1941), prevents federal judges from doing this, it says nothing about the ability of
states to manipulate their own choice-of-law principles to facilitate class certification. Indeed,
were a state to explicitly adopt a choice-of-law rule applicable to class actions that differed from
its ordinary conflicts principles, Klaxon presumably would require a federal court sitting in
diversity to apply it.
66. See John H. Beisner & Jessica Davidson Miller, They're Making a FederalCase Out
ofIt... In State Court, 25 HARv. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 143, 160-63 (2001) (discussing primary
findings of study identifying certain county courts as having disproportionately high volumes

of class action filings); see also DEBORAHR.HENSLER ETAL., CLASS ACTIONS DILEMMAS 58-63
(2000) (discussing "hot states" for class action filings).
67. See Sugarman et al., supranote 27, at B 11 (asserting that plaintiffs' lawyers have been
attempting "an end-run around the choice-of-law problems inherent in certifying a nationwide
class" action by arguing for the universal application of the law of the defendant's
headquarters); Ryan, supra note 27, at 480 ("[Ilnevitably, in every nationwide state-law class
action, the plaintiffs will argue for the application of a single state's law ....
").
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system and the federal courts sitting in Oklahoma 61 to apply the law of the
defendant's home state in warranty class actions. Read more broadly, it
suggests that, in a putative class action, courts may select law for the class
based on the contacts and needs of the class as a whole. 69 By reducing choice
of law as an obstacle to class certification, Ysbrand stands to increase the
desirability of Oklahoma as a forum for future national state law class
actions.70
IV. The Impact of IndividualIssues on the PredominanceRequirement
Even when the law of a single state governs a class claim, the
predominance requirement still might block class certification if the class
members must offer individualized proof for substantial issues associated with
that claim. The problem of individual issues goes to the core of representative
litigation; it asks whether resolving the class representative's claim really will
resolve the claims of absent class members. 7 If absent class members' claims
will require significant amounts of additional litigation, then the suit starts to
look more like a consolidated mass trial than true representative litigation. At
that point, one might fairly question whether allowing the lead plaintiff to sue
as a representative achieves the efficiency goals promoted by the (b)(3) class
action device.
In business and consumer class actions, a few potential individual issues
come up regularly.72 First, there may be small but significant variations in the
68. In a diversity case, a federal court must apply the conflicts laws of the state in which
it sits. See Klaxon, 313 U.S. at 496.
69. See supra notes 49-53 and accompanying text.
70. See Miller & Crump, supra note 30, at 57 (discussing the concept of magnet forums).
71. The Alabama Supreme Court put it this way: "To determine whether common issues
of law or fact predominate in this case, the trial court must examine the [representative
plaintiff's] causes of action and consider 'what value the resolution of the class-wide issue will
have in each class member's underlying cause of action."' Alfa Life Ins. Corp. v. Hughes, No.
1011091, 2003 WL 1949824, at *5 (Ala. Apr. 25, 2003) (quoting Reynolds Metals Co. v. Hill,
825 So. 2d 100, 104 (Ala. 2002)).
72. Damages is the most obvious issue that one might expect to require individualized
proof. See 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 4:26, at 220. Following the Advisory
Committee notes to the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, however, federal courts rarely base a lack
of predominance on the need to calculate damages individually. Id.; see also 5 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supranote 2, § 23.46[2]. The First Circuit recently summarized this view:
"T'he individuation of damages in consumer class actions is rarely determinative under Rule
23(b)(3). Where, as here, common questions predominate regarding liability, then courts
generally find the predominance requirement to be satisfied even if individual damages issues
remain." Smilow v. S.W. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2003). But see
O'Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 319 F.3d 732, 744-45 (5th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the trial court erred in certifying class action because of the need for extensive individual
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transactions that the different class members had with the defendant. Second,
even when the class members engaged in virtually identical transactions, the
court may require them to make individualized showings of certain elements,
one of the most important being reliance. This Part examines how Oklahoma
courts have addressed those individual issue complications under section
2023(B)(3).73
A. TransactionalVariations
On the surface, an allegation that a defendant engaged in a common scheme
of misconduct might seem to inherently satisfy the section 2023(B)(3)
predominance requirement, but this really depends on what was "common"
about the alleged misconduct. Sometimes the class members share the
common characteristic of having purchased the same inferior product from the
defendant.7 4 Other times the characteristic common to the class members is
that the defendant applied a uniform practice in its business dealings with
them.75 But common misconduct in either sense does not necessarily establish
damages calculations). The only Oklahoma case to address this issue is in accord with the
majority view. See Perry v. Meek, 1980 OK 151,1 15, 618 P.2d 934, 939 ("[Tlhe fact that
members of the class will be called upon to establish individual accountings of the amount of
their damages shall not of itself defeat a class action.").
73. Individual issues can have a very similar impact on predominance in other contexts.
In Amchem Products,Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 (1997), for example, the U.S. Supreme
Court found that individual issues relating to exposure and causation predominated in a
proposed asbestos class action. Amchem, 521 U.S. at 624-25 (also noting that state law
differences compounded the problem). While no published Oklahoma decision addresses
individual issues in a mass tort class action context, one might draw profitable parallels between
the individual issues of exposure and causation in mass tort cases and the individual issues of
transactional variance and reliance in commercial cases. For general discussion of the impact
of individual issues on predominance in mass tort cases, see 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE,
supra note 2, § 23.47[4].
74. See, e.g., In re Bridgestone/Firestone, Inc., 288 F.3d 1012, 1015 (7th Cir. 2002)
(alleging that defendants engaged in "conduct that was uniform across the nation" by selling
defective tires); Szabo v. Bridgeport Machines, Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 673-74 (7th Cir. 2001)
(alleging common misconduct of selling defective machine tool); In re St. Jude Med., Inc.
Silzone Heart Valves Prods. Liab. Litig., NO. MDL 01-1396 JRT/FLN, 2003 WL 1589527, at
*5 (D. Minn. Mar. 27, 2003) (finding that design, manufacture, marketing, and selling of
allegedly defective product was conduct "uniform across all plaintiffs").
75. See, e.g., Smilow, 323 F.3d at 34 (alleging common misconduct of charging customers
for incoming calls contrary to uniform contract terms); Moore v. PaineWebber, Inc., 306 F.3d
1247, 1250 (2d Cir. 2002) (alleging that class members were all victims of defendant's
coordinated scheme to misrepresent an insurance product as a retirement savings product);
Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 171 (3d Cir. 2001)
(alleging that defendants uniform practice of executing trades at NASDAQ bid price, when
better prices were available through other sources, was a common scheme of unlawful conduct).
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that the class members' common issues predominate over individual issues
because, while the defendant's ultimate actions were essentially the same for
all, their original bargains might have been different. In other words,
uniformity of performance allows for true representative litigation only when
joined with uniformity of obligation. As to any particular class member, we
cannot know if the defendant told a lie or breached a promise until we know
76
what the defendant communicated to that class member in the first place.
Class claims for fraud offer a useful insight into the relationship between
transactional variance and predominance. At one end of the spectrum, the
federal courts view oral misrepresentations as presumptively individualized,
and therefore typically deny class certification unless the plaintiff can show
that there was no material variation in the misrepresentations.77 At the other
end of the spectrum, the courts are much more likely to find predominance in
a class action based on written misrepresentations because of the belief that
individual proof is not necessary to establish the details of each transaction.78
The Oklahoma Supreme Court takes a pragmatic approach to transactional
variance. In KMC Leasing, Inc. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp.,79 for instance,
the court found that variations in the contracts of the individual class members
supported the trial court's decision to deny certification.8" In Black Hawk Oil
Co. v. Exxon Corp.,8 however, the court found that variations in the contracts
did not preclude certification. 2 The decisions are quite easy to reconcile,
however. In Black Hawk Oil, the court rejected defendant Exxon's contention
that a factfinder would need to interpret each of the 600 different contracts
involved separately because the court found that the contracts fell into four
general categories.83 In contrast, class members in KMC Leasing had
76. Predominance concerns can exist even when there is both a common conduct and a
common duty. See, e.g., O'Sullivan, 319 F.3d at 742 (demonstrating that the common closing
practice in a Real Estate Settlement Procedures Act (RESPA) suit alleging a practice of
overcharging for closing services was insufficient to overcome predominance because liability
would require individual comparisons of compensation to actual services).
77. See Moore, 306 F.3d at 1253-55 (discussing decisions from the Third, Fourth, Fifth,
Sixth, and Seventh Circuits); see also 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 1782, at 56 ("[Ifthe
action was based on consumer fraud and defendant was alleged to have perpetrated the fraud
by means of oral misrepresentations, the common questions probably would not be found to
predominate.").
78. See 5 MOORE'sFEDERALPRACTICE, supra note 2, § 23.47[1][b][ii] (discussing written
misrepresentations in securities fraud).
79. 2000 OK 51, 9 P.3d 683.
80. Id. 24, 9 P.3d at 690-91.
81. 1998 OK 70, 969 P.2d 337.
82. Id. I 20, 969 P.2d at 344.
83. Id. 1 19-20, 969 P.2d at 344; see also Handley v. Santa Fe Minerals, Inc., 1992 OK
CIV APP 149, 9, 849 P.2d 433,435 (disregarding contract variances that did not impact the
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nonuniform purchase contracts, such that "the trial court would be forced to
analyze each individual contract as to its disclaimers, warranties, applicable
choice of law and statute of limitation."4 Thus, transactional variance matters
in Oklahoma, but only to the extent the contracts actually vary in a material
way.
One Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals decision takes a different - and
somewhat questionable - approach to predominance and contract variance.
In GregholLtd. Partnershipv. Oryx Energy Co.,5 the putative class consisted
of royalty and royalty-interest owners who alleged that Oryx Energy
improperly assessed post-production charges against their royalties.8 6 Oryx
Energy argued that the validity of post-production charges was a contractual
matter, and presented testimony showing that the class members' contracts did
not have uniform royalty clauses.8 7 The court of civil appeals affirmed
certification of the class despite what appeared to be relevant and significant
royalty clause variations, claiming that the predominant issue was whether
Oryx Energy assessed post production charges against all interest owners
equally, "regardless of the terms of their conveyances.""8 Certainly, the
putative class alleged that Oryx did so. But whether Oryx's conduct was
unlawful depends on the terms of its contracts with the class members. In
other words, only by looking at the interest owners' contracts can the court
know what Oryx's obligations were in the first place. If the court's
preliminary conclusion had been that Oryx entered into essentially the same
deal with every interest owner, then there would be little transactional
variance requiring individualized proof. But if, as may have been the case
here, the court would have to compare Oryx's uniform conduct against a wide
range of contractual obligations, then it is difficult to see how the issue of
royalty clause underlying the class-wide claim).
84. KMC Leasing,124, 9 P.3d at 690; see also Sias v. Edge Communications, Inc., 2000
OK CIV APP 72, 1 18, 8 P.3d 182, 188 (affirming denial of class certification where the
plaintiff "has not established that the different designs uniformly indicated a 19 cents a minute
rate or failed to mention access and interconnect fees, or that the point of sale marketing was
in other material respects uniform"). It is also important to note that in each case the Oklahoma
Supreme Court upheld the trial court's original decision - to grant class certification in Black
Hawk Oil but to deny class certification in KMC Leasing - under an abuse of discretion
standard. Thus, perhaps the lesson to be learned is that a court does not abuse its discretion by
either: (1) granting class status in a contract case where the trial court feels it can harmonize the
contracts; or (2) denying class status in a contract case where the trial court feels it would need
to construe each contract separately.
85. 1998 OK CIV APP 111, 959 P.2d 596.
86. Id. 2, 959 P.2d at 597-98.
87. Id. 4, 959 P.2d at 598.
88. Id. 7, 959 P.2d at 599.
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Oryx's uniform method of imposing post production charges predominates
over the individual issues of what charges Oryx was entitled to impose on any
particular interest owner.8 9
B. Reliance
One of the most prominent issues in (b)(3) class certification is whether a
putative class can satisfy the predominance requirement when reliance is an
element of the cause of action. Specifically, certain causes of action - fraud
being the most prominent - typically require that the plaintiff prove both that
the defendant made an improper representation and that the plaintiff relied on
it to his detriment. 90 As a result, even where the class can establish obligation
and breach via common proof, individual proof still might be required to
ascertain whether each class member relied on the defendant's common
misconduct. It goes without saying that the potential need to prove reliance
on a class-member-by-class-member basis has severe implications for the
court's task of deciding whether common issues predominate over individual
issues.
At the outset, it is important to distinguish between situations where
reliance is an element of the plaintiff's cause of action from situations where
it is more akin to an affirmative defense of "nonreliance." In certain types of
federal securities fraud contexts, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court has
interpreted the underlying law to presume that the individual investors relied
on the defendant's misrepresentations.'
Thus, there is a rebuttable
89. See also Shockey v. Chevron U.S.A., Inc., No. CJ-2001-7, slip op. (Washita County,
July 3,2002) (opinion on file with author) (finding predominance because Chevron "uniformly"
disregarded lease language when calculating royalties, despite claim by Chevron that the court
would need to look to the language of each lease to determine what royalties were owed).
90. See Rogers v. Meiser, 2003 OK 6,1 17,68 P.3d 967,977 (listing elements of common
law fraud, including reliance); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 537 (1977). In contrast,
state consumer protection statutes typically no longer require plaintiffs to prove reliance. See
Seth W. Goren, A Pothole on the Road to Recovery: Reliance andPrivateClassActions Under
Pennsylvania's UnfairTrade Practicesand Consumer ProtectionLaw, 107 DICK. L. REV. 1,
13 & n.50 (2002) (listing requirements by state). For this reason, one publication notes that,
in cases where a state deceptive practices act remedy is available, "it is pragmatic to omit a
common law fraud claim unless there is some compelling reason to include it." NAT'L
CONSUMER LAW CTR., CONSUMER CLASS ACTIONS § 1.5.3, at 16 (5th ed. 2002).
91. See Basic, Inc. v. Levinson, 485 U.S. 224, 248 (1988) ("fraud on the market"
presumption for Rule lOb-5 claims associated with securities traded in a developed market);
Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 153 (1972) (reliance presumed in
securities fraud cases stemming from a defendant's nondisclosure of material information). In
those cases, predominance is more readily met because the Supreme Court has relieved the class
members ofhaving to individually prove reliance. See William B. Rubenstein, A Transactional
Model of Adjudication, 89 GEO. L.J. 371, 392 (2001) ("[F]raud-on-the-market enables
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presumption of reliance that shifts the burden to the defendant to offer proof
of nonreliance.9 2 Similarly, the law of express warranty no longer requires
buyers to prove that they relied on the seller's representations or affirmations
of fact, but instead requires the defendant to offer "clear affirmative proof'
that such representations or affirmations were not part of the "basis of the
bargain."93 This too creates a de facto presumption of reliance that shifts the
burden of proving nonreliance onto the defendant seller.' In cases where the
plaintiffs may properly invoke a presumption,9 5 courts typically do not view
the issue of reliance as an obstacle to satisfying the predominance
requirement.96
certification by turning common-law individual issues into market-based common issues.").
92. See Basic, 485 U.S. at 248 (stating that defendants may rebut presumption with "[a]ny
showing that severs the link between the alleged misrepresentation and either the price received
(or paid) by the plaintiff, or his decision to trade at a fair market price"); see also 5 MOORE'S
FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 23.47[l1][c][i] (discussing rebuttable presumption in
nondisclosure cases under Affiliated Ute Citizens).
93. See U.C.C. § 2-313 cmt. 3 (1989) ("In actual practice affirmations of fact made by the
seller about the goods during a bargain are regarded as part of the description of those goods;
hence, no particular reliance on such statements need be shown .... Rather, any fact which is
to take such affirmations, once made, out of the agreement requires clear affirmative proof.");
see also Samuel Issacharoff, The Vexing Problem of Reliance in Consumer Class Actions, 74
TUL. L. REV. 1633, 1652 (2000) (arguing that "basis of the bargain" does not incorporate a
reliance element but instead is defined by the seller's conduct).
94. See JAMESJ. WHITE&ROBERTS. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIALCODE § 9-5, at 352
(5th ed. 2000). The authors are careful to note, however, that some courts have interpreted the
"basis of the bargain" principle to require proof of reliance. Id.; see also Henry Schein, Inc. v.
Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 686 & n.23 (Tex. 2002) (holding that Texas warranty law requires
reliance "to a certain extent").
95. Courts often reject arguments that a presumption is available. See, e.g., McManus v.
Fleetwood Enters., Inc., 320 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2003) ("Reliance may not be presumed
under Texas law."); Sikes v. Teleline, Inc., 281 F.3d 1350, 1362 (11 th Cir. 2002), cert denied,
537 U.S. 884 (2002) (reliance may not be presumed under RICO); Cohn v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins.
Co., 189 F.R.D. 209, 215-16 (D. Conn. 1999) (reliance may not be presumed under Connecticut
law). But see Spark v. MBNA Corp., 178 F.R.D. 431,436 (D. Del. 1998) (presuming reliance
under RICO because "it is 'logical' to presume reliance in this case," and then finding
predominance). See generally5 MOORE'S FEDERALPRACrICE, supra note 2, § 23.47 [2] (unlike
the rule in securities fraud cases, "plaintiffs must prove individual reliance" in consumer fraud
actions).
96. See 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 23.47[1][c][iii] (stating that
reliance is not a bar to certification in securities fraud cases when it may be presumed). The way
courts view presumed reliance parallels their approach to affirmative defenses generally. Courts
seem to discount individual issues when they are part of the defendant's proof rather than the
plaintiff's. See Smilow v. S.W. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2003) ("Courts
traditionally have been reluctant to deny class action status under Rule 23(b)(3) simply because
affirmative defenses may be available against individual members."); Shores v. First City Bank
Corp., 1984 OK 67,1 16, 689 P.2d 299, 304 ("The claim that there exists sufficient individual
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When the burden of proving individual reliance is placed squarely on the
plaintiff, it can be fatal to meeting the predominance requirement. 97 The Fifth
Circuit, for example, has adopted an almost per se rule that the need to
establish reliance on a class-member-by-class-member basis precludes a
finding of predominance.98 Indeed, the federal courts reject class certification
even in securities cases where the presumption of reliance is not applicable,
reasoning that the class members' need to prove individual reliance precludes
a finding of predominance. 99 But while the need to prove individual reliance
statute of limitations defenses to prevent class action certification has not found much favor with
");see also 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 4:26, at 243-44 (existence of
the courts ....
"affirmative defenses against various class members" usually will not bar finding of
predominance); 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 23.46[3] (stating that statute
of limitations issues typically do not bar certification). Though I do not intend to resolve the
issue here, I have some doubt about whether predominance ought to vary based on who bears
the burden of proving an issue. In fraud cases, for example, it is unclear why the existence of
a presumption would satisfy predominance in cases where the defendant asserts that it will
attempt to rebut the presumption of reliance for every class member; each case would require
class-member-by-class-member proof explaining why that class member entered into the
transaction at issue. See, e.g., Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance Nat'l Indem. Ins. Co.,
319 F.3d 205, 221 (5th Cir. 2003) (finding that predominance is not satisfied by expert
testimony of industry reliance because even though it might persuade a trier of fact, it "would
not justify excluding proof demonstrating a lack of reliance by individual plaintiffs");
Gyamarthy & Assocs., Inc. v. TIG Ins. Co., No. Civ. A. 3:02-CV-1245, at *3 (N.D. Tex. June
3, 2003) (noting that predominance depends not just on the plaintiffs issues and proof but the
defendants as well).
97. See, e.g., Miller v. Gen. Motors Corp., No. 98-C-7389, 2003 WL 168626, at *3 (N.D.
Ii. Jan. 27, 2003) (stating that it would consider certifying fraud class only for states in which
reliance is not an element or where it can be presumed); In re Managed Care Litig., 209 F.R.D.
678, 691-92 (S.D. Fla. 2002) ("The only way to determine what each plaintiff relied upon is to
ask each individual plaintiff- something which, if done, precludes class certification because
individual issues will predominate over the class issues."). See generally 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL
PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 23.47[21 ("[C]ourts have generally denied class certification in
private consumer fraud actions brought under state law or [RICO] because individual [reliance]
questions predominate in such cases."). For a more extended (albeit defense-oriented and
Texas-focused) analysis of the effect of reliance on predominance, see The Appellate Practice
Group of Locke Liddell & Sapp, LLP, RecurringIssues in ConsumerandBusinessClassAction
Litigationin Texas, 33 TEX. TECH. L. REV. 971, 1018 (2002) (arguing that courts cannot certify
(b)(3) class actions when reliance must be proved individually without the benefit of any
presumption).
98. See McManus, 320 F.3d at 550 (holding that the need to prove individual reliance
precludes class certification of fraud and breach of warranty claims); Patterson v. Mobil Oil
Corp., 241 F.3d 417, 419 (5th Cir. 2001) ("Claims for money damages in which individual
reliance is an element are poor candidates for class treatment, at best. We have made that
plain."); Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734,745 (5th Cir. 1996) ("[A] fraud class action
cannot be certified when individual reliance will be an issue.").
99. See, e.g., Johnston v. HBO Film Mgmt., Inc., 265 F.3d 178, 191-93 (3d Cir. 2001)
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makes class certification difficult, it is not impossible. Some courts have
refused to consider individual reliance as a bar to predominance on the basis
that it goes to the plaintiffs right to recover, rather than to "underlying
common issues of the defendant's liability."''
In other cases, courts have
acknowledged that individual reliance is a factor but nevertheless find that, for
the case as a whole, the issues that are indisputably common simply
predominate over reliance, even when the proof will be individualized.' 0
Some apparent tension between cases from the Oklahoma Supreme Court
and the Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals suggests that this issue is still
evolving under section 2023. The court of civil appeals has twice explicitly
cited the need for each class member to prove reliance as a basis for rejecting
class certification of fraud claims.' 02 In contrast, the Oklahoma Supreme
Court has twice rejected reliance-based predominance challenges to class
certification. In Black Hawk Oil,the court acknowledged that reliance was an
essential element of the class members' claim that Exxon defrauded them by
sending incomplete monthly statements,0 3 but nevertheless upheld class
certification on the basis that "[tihe need to show individual reliance has not
precluded class [action] treatment in cases where standardized written

(affirming denial of certification because securities fraud claim involved affirmative
misrepresentations regarding securities that were not traded on an open and efficient market, for
which there is no presumption of reliance); Kelley v. Mid-America Racing Stables, Inc., 139
F.R.D. 405, 409 (W.D. Okla. 1990) (concluding that "issues of individual reliance will
overwhelm other common issues, and common issues will not predominate" after finding that
presumption did not apply); see also Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc.,
259 F.3d 154, 174-75 (3d Cir. 2001) (discussing presumptions available under different
securities fraud theories). Accordingly, one should keep these presumptions in mind when
reading the Supreme Court's recent statement that "[piredominance is a test readily met in
certaincases alleging consumer or securities fraud." Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S.
591, 625 (1997) (emphasis added).
100. See 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 4:26, at 241.
101. See, e.g., Bussie v. Allmerica Fin. Corp., 50 F. Supp. 2d 59, 71 (D. Mass. 1999)
(finding that common issues predominated despite existence of individual issues like reliance
and damages); Arenson v. Whitehall Convalescent & Nursing Home, Inc., 164 F.R.D. 659,666
(N.D. Ill. 1996) (finding predominance despite need to prove individual reliance for common
law fraud claim).
102. See Sias v. Edge Comm., Inc., 2000 OK CIV APP 72,1 18, 8 P.3d 182, 188; Bunch v.
KMart Corp., 1995 OK CIV APP 41,1 6,898 P.2d 170, 172; see also Conatzer v. Am. Mercury
Ins. Co., 2000 OK CIV APP 141,125, 15 P.3d 1252, 1258 (citing Bunch and affirming denial
of class certification in used car certificate fraud case in part because of "factual variables"
including individual reliance).
103. Black Hawk Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp., 1998 OK 70, 29, 969 P.2d 337, 345. The
monthly statements failed to account for the "slop oil" that Exxon collected but failed to pay
royalties on. Id. 30, 969 P.2d at 345.
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misrepresentations have been made to class members. '"' °4 The Ysbrand
opinion also acknowledged the possibility of an individual reliance
requirement (under Michigan warranty law), but still upheld class certification

of the warranty claims, explaining that "[f]actual variations in the individual
claims will not normally preclude class certification if the claim arises from
the same event or course of conduct
as the class claims, and gives rise to the
0°5
same legal or remedial theory.""
If the passages from Black Hawk Oil and Ysbrand articulate Oklahoma's
view about certifying a class action in which individual reliance might be an
element, then Oklahoma seems to have adopted a relatively liberal approach
to certifying such class actions. There is a danger of drawing too strong a
conclusion from these cases, however. The court did not state that the need
to prove reliance was not a factor at all, just that it did not appear to be an
insurmountable one under the circumstances. Thus, Black Hawk Oil and
Ysbrand may simply reflect the Oklahoma Supreme Court's deference to trial
courts on issues of case management.'0 6 But even so, such a view would
represent a notable departure from the hard-line approach of other
jurisdictions where the presence of individual reliance presumptively
forecloses (b)(3) class certification.0 7 Like Oklahoma's approach to choice
of law, a liberal approach to predominance in cases involving individual
reliance also might raise the antenna of class counsel engaged in the process

of selecting a forum.

104. Id. 1 30, 969 P.2d at 345 (quoting 4 CONTE & NEWBERG, supranote 3, § 22:49, at 22201 (3d ed. 1992)). It is important to differentiate the issue of transactional variation discussed
above. In that context, the courts treat oral and written misrepresentations differently based on
what proof might be needed to establish the terms of the defendant's obligation to individual
class members. See supra notes 74-89 and accompanying text. Here, the question is whether
the plaintiff acted because of those misrepresented terms or for some other reason. In this latter
context, having predominance turn on whether the misrepresentation was oral or written
assumes that a class member would be more likely to rely on a written misrepresentation versus
an oral one.
105. Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2003 OK 17,121, No. 97,469,2003 WL 437160,
at *6 (quoting Lobo Exploration Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 1999 OK CIV APP 112, 17, 991
P.2d 1048, 1055). The court offered two additional reasons for its ruling. First, it suggested
that it considered the topic off limits, stating that "[w]hether individual findings of reliance are
required goes to the merits of the claims." Id. Second, the court noted that any problems
created by the need to address individual issues could be resolved by certifying issue classes
under section 2023(C)(4)(a) or subclasses under section 2023(C)(4)(b). Id. I discuss the
permissibility of making merits inquiries at the certification stage and the use of subclasses and
issue classes to alleviate individual issue problems in Part V infra.
106. See infra notes 142-47 and accompanying text.
107. See supra notes 97-99 and accompanying text.
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V. The Scope and Depth of the CertificationInquiry
On the surface, the mechanics of certifying a class action in Oklahoma are
both well established and straightforward. The party seeking class
certification - almost always the plaintiff - has the burden of proving each
of the requisite elements for the type of class action proposed.'s In assessing
the plaintiff's showing, however, the trial court should give the class plaintiffs
the benefit of the doubt: "The pragmatically correct action, in the face of a
close question as to certification, has been said to sustain certification because
if it develops later during the course of the trial that the order is ill advised, the
09
order is always (prior to judgment on the merits,) subject to modification."'
While the trial court's certification decision is immediately reviewable, "°the
appellate court may reverse only for abuse of discretion."
This relatively simple procedural framework, however, masks a more
complicated reality. The plaintiff and defendant may have very different
views about what issues will be in dispute and how they should be tried, let
alone how each issue's relative weight and significance impacts the
predominance requirement. Thus, the trial court's first task is to determine
what the issues in the class action actually will be. The trial court must then
consider the mechanics and logistics of trying those issues, including whether
the class action can be structured in a way to minimize the effect of the
individual issues. Only then can the trial court determine whether the
common issues predominate over the individual ones.
A. Scrutinizing the Content of the Claims and Defenses
Perhaps the most basic principle governing the class certification inquiry
is that trial courts are not to engage in merits analysis." 2 While this principle
is universally acknowledged, however, it is not universally understood or

108. See KMC Leasing, Inc. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 2000 OK 51, 1 12, 9 P.3d 683,
688.
109. Ysbrand, 15,2003 WL437160, at *2 (quoting Perry v. Meek, 1980OK 151,1 19,618
P.2d 934, 940).
110. See 12 OKLA. STAT. § 993(A)(6) (2001).
111. See KMC Leasing, 15,9 P.3d at 687 (holding that an order denying certification should
be reviewed for abuse of discretion); Black Hawk Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp., 1998 OK 70, 10,
969 P.2d 337, 342 (holding that an order granting certification should be reviewed for abuse of
discretion).
112. See Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156, 177 (1974) ("We find nothing in either
the language or history of Rule 23 that gives a court any authority to conduct a preliminary
inquiry into the merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be maintained as a class
action."); see also Black Hawk Oil, 129, 969 P.2d at 345 (noting that courts may not consider
the merits of the case on a certification motion).
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applied." 3 As originally pronounced, the so-called "Eisen" rule meant that
courts should not base their certification decisions on whether they thought
the claims of the class would succeed or fail. 4 The reasoning behind this rule
was that class actions should run the risk of losing as well as winning. 1 5 If
courts certified only cases that they thought were "winners," then the class
action device would subject defendants to global losses, but never allow them
to achieve global wins." 6 Over time, however, the bar against making merits
evaluations at certification evolved in some courts into a rule that prevented
the trial judge from scrutinizing the parties' assertions about what they
intended to prove and how they intended to prove it. 17
Properly understood, the "Eisen" rule encompasses only its narrower
meaning - that courts should not evaluate the meritsfor the purpose of sifting
the "winners" from the "losers," and then certifying only the winners.
However, it does not obligate the court to blindly accept the representations
of the party seeking certification, nor does it prohibit the court from drawing
its own conclusions about what issues will need to be decided and how." i To
the contrary, scholars and most courts now recognize that the certification
process requires courts to delve into the merits, at least insofar as that is
necessary to know what the issues will be and how the parties intend to prove
them.' As one recent article explains,
113. See Robert G. Bone & David S. Evans, Class Certificationandthe Substantive Merits,
51 DUKE L.J. 1251, 1270 (2002) (asserting that variations in understanding of the rule has
produced a "muddled body of case law").
114. See 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 23.46[4].
115. See Szabo v. Bridgeport Machs., Inc., 249 F.3d 672, 677 (7th Cir. 2001).
116. See id.
117. See Bone & Evans, supra note 113, at 1272.
118. See Gen. Tel. Co. v. Falcon, 457 U.S. 147, 160-61 (1982) (requiring trial courts to
perform a "rigorous analysis" of the Rule 23(a) prerequisites and instructing that in doing so the
courts are free "to probe behind the pleadings"); see, e.g., Johnston v. HBO Film Mgmt., Inc.,
265 F.3d 178, 189 (3d Cir. 2001) (reviewing factual record to see if plaintiffs really did receive
uniform representations).
119. See Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 168 (3d Cir.
2001) ("In reviewing a motion for class certification, a preliminary inquiry into the merits is
sometimes necessary to determine whether the alleged claims can be properly resolved as a class
action."). See generally 5 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 23.61[5] ("In some
cases it may be necessary to make a preliminary inquiry into the merits when that determination
is necessary to a certification inquiry, and this is not forbidden by Eisen."). The advisory
committee notes to the proposed amendments to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 also express
this view:
Although an evaluation of the probable outcome on the merits is not properly part
of the certification decision, discovery in aid of the certification decision often
includes information required to identify the nature of the issues that actually will
be presented at trial. In this sense it is appropriate to conduct controlled discovery
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To assess predominance, for instance, a judge has to determine
which common questions are serious subjects for litigation and
how much of the litigation will be devoted to resolving them. So
too she must predict which individual questions will loom large,
how important they will be, and how much time and energy will be
devoted to litigating them. 20
Thus, the trial court can and should assess the parties claims and proofs, but
should do so from an outcome-neutral vantage point of trial mechanics,
certifying apparent "losers" when the issues and proofs are predominantly
common, but denying certification to apparent "winners" when the court is
convinced that the individual issues are too numerous and significant.
Oklahoma case law suggests some lingering confusion about whether
Oklahoma courts may consider the impact of individual issues on
predominance without violating the rule against prejudging the merits. The
confusion seems to stem from the Oklahoma Supreme Court's decision in
Black Hawk Oil v. Exxon Corp, in which the court quoted another case for the
proposition that "'[d]efendants may raise non-reliance as an affirmative
defense at trial but it is inappropriate to raise non-reliance at the certification
stage because entry into the intricacies of reliance goes to the merits of the
case and cannot be considered by a court on a certification motion."""
Subsequently, one Oklahoma Court of Civil Appeals case interpreted that
passage to specifically preclude considering a defendant's argument that the
common issues did not predominate in that case because each plaintiff would
into the "merits," limited to those aspects relevant to making the certification
decision on an informed basis.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 advisory committee's note (Proposed 2003), available at http:llwww.
uscourts.gov/rules/congress0303.html.
120. Bone & Evans, supra note 113, at 1269. The Fifth Circuit recently elaborated on this
point:
Determining whether legal issues common to the class predominate over
individual issues requires that the court inquire how the case will be tried. This
entails identifying the substantive issues that will control the outcome, assessing
which issues will predominate, and then determining whether the issues are
common to the class. Although this inquiry does not resolve the case on its
merits, it requires that the court look beyond the pleadings to "understand the
claims, defenses, relevant facts, and applicable substantive law." Such an
understanding prevents the class from degenerating into a series of individual
trials.
O'Sullivan v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc., 319 F.3d 732, 738 (5th Cir. 2003) (citations
omitted) (quoting Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 744 (5th Cir. 1996)).
121. 1998 OK 70,129,969 P.2d 337,345 (quoting Gorsey v. I.M. Simon & Co., 121 F.R.D.
135, 139 (D. Mass. 1988)).
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need to prove reliance individually. 2 2 And most recently, the Ysbrand court
hinted at a similar result. 23 Broadly read, these decisions could handcuff
litigants and courts in their efforts to identify the existence of individual issues
that would argue against a finding of predominance.
More probably, however, the Oklahoma Supreme Court subscribes to the
modem view that a court may consider the merits insofar as they inform what
individual issues might be a part of the adjudicatory process. First, when put
in context, the passage from Black Hawk Oil supports the modem flexible
view rather than a rigid "merits" bar. The defendant's argument against
certification in Black Hawk Oil was that the class plaintiffs in fact could not
prove reliance. 24 The court's response, which immediately precedes the
passage usually quoted, was that "[ilnability to prove reliance may ultimately
defeat [the plaintiffs'] claims but the mere possibility that their proof on this
issue might fail is not grounds to deny certification of the class."' 25 Thus, the
holding of Black Hawk Oil was no more than that courts should not allow their
beliefs about whether a case is strong or weak to impact their assessment of
whether the class certification requirements are met. More recently, in KMC
Leasing v. Rockwell-Standard, Inc., the Oklahoma Supreme Court had
occasion to reflect on the significance of Black Hawk Oil. The plaintiffs
apparently invoked Black Hawk Oil to argue that the trial court had
improperly considered the merits when it assessed the predominance of
individual issues, including reliance.' 26 In response, the court explained that
"[e]ven though the potential inability of proposed class representatives to
prove their fraud claims relates to the merits and is inappropriate to the
certification stage, (see Black Hawk Oil Co. v. Exxon Corp., 1998 OK 70,
18, 969 P.2d 337, 343 (amended on denial of reh'g.)) the process itself is
appropriate for consideration.' 2 7
122. See Lobo Exploration Co. v. Amoco Prod. Co., 1999OK CIV APP 112,1 14,991 P.2d
1048, 1054.
123. In response to DaimlerChrylser's argument that common issues did not predominate
because each class member would need to prove that she relied on DaimlerChrysler's
warranties, the court began by stating that "[w]hether individual findings ofreliance are required
goes to the merits of the claims." Ysbrand v. DainlerChrysler Corp., 2003 OK 17, 12 1, No.
97,469, 2003 WL 437160, at *6 (Feb. 25, 2003). It did not cite to Black Hawk Oil, however,
nor did it rely on the alleged merits bar, but instead actually considered the impact of potential
individual issues, ultimately concluding that the common issues still predominated. See id.
124. See Black Hawk Oil, 129, 969 P.2d at 345.
125. Id.
126. KMC Leasing, Inc. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 2000 OK 51,1 27,9 P.3d 683,691.
127. Id. 1 26, 9 P.3d at 691. The court made a similar, albeit less opaque, comment with
respect to choice of law. While it held that the ultimate determination of what law would apply
was a merits issue, it deemed itself empowered to consider and factor in the multitude of issues
that might conceivably require a different law when making its predominance ruling. Id. 20,
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It is important to appreciate that delving into the merits to identify the
moving parts for trial does not reflect a bias against class certification. It is
true that a process that asks the trial court to take a hard look at the plaintiff's
claims will often result in the conclusion that they include essential elements
that defy common proof.128 However, that same process also permits courts
to scrutinize defendants' claims that predominance is inappropriate because
of the individual proof defendants claim will be necessary. 129 Indeed, almost
twenty years ago the Oklahoma Supreme Court appears to have done just that
in concluding that the statute of limitations issue a defendant claimed
precluded a finding of predominance was "not a real issue."' 30 It may be that
deeper merits of scrutiny may have a greater impact on plaintiffs because they
are more likely to carry the burden of proving an individual issue. Any such
disparate impact, however, is a function not of procedural bias but the
underlying substantive law.
B. Certifying a Class Without DeterminingHow the Individual Issues Will
Be Resolved
Determining predominance requires the court to do more than just identify
which issues are amenable to common proof and which require individual
proof. In addition, the court must make a qualitative judgment about the
relative significance and weight of those issues.' 3 '
One important
methodological issue that arises concerns the type of analysis that a court is

9 P.3d at 690.
128. See, e.g., Sandwich Chef of Texas, Inc. v. Reliance Nat'l Indem. Ins. Co., 319 F.3d 205,
220 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting plaintiff's assertion that it could conclusively establish reliance
through expert testimony of business custom); Johnston v. HBO Film Mgmt., Inc., 265 F.3d
178, 186, 191-93 (3d Cir. 2001) (rejecting plaintiff's assertion that court could presume reliance
after inspecting the record and concluding that the misrepresentations were not uniform and that
the plaintiffs were asserting a type of securities claim that does not carry a reliance
presumption).
129. See, e.g., Smilow v. S.W. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 39 (1st Cir. 2003)
(rejecting defendant's assertion that individual "waiver" issues would overwhelm common
issues); In re Linerboard Antitrust Litig., 305 F.3d 145, 163 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting
defendant's assertion that trial of individual fraudulent concealment issues would overwhelm
common issues); In re Corel Corp. Inc. Sec. Litig., 206 F.R.D. 533, 544 (E.D. Pa. 2002)
(finding that defendants failed to show that they could rebut reliance presumption such that
individualized reliance proofs would be necessary).
130. Shores v. First City Bank Corp., 1984 OK 67,1 16,689 P.2d 299, 304 ("On the record
here it does not appear likely that there will be numerous bondholders who should have
discovered the bank's alleged defalcations sufficiently long ago to allow the running of the
statute of limitations.")
131. See supra notes 20-26 and accompanying text.
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required to perform before it may conclude that the common issues
predominate over the individual ones.
Some jurisdictions require trial courts to offer concrete plans for resolving
individual issues before certifying a (b)(3) class action. In Texas, for
example, a class certification order must include "a rigorous analysis and a
specific explanation of how class claims are to proceed to trial."'3 2 While the
trial court need not draft a formal trial plan, 133 the "certification order must
indicate how the claims will likely be tried so that conformance with [Rule
23(b)(3)] may be meaningfully evaluated."' 34 The Texas Supreme Court
adopted this rule in large part to combat what it referred to as the "certify now
and worry later" approach to class certification in which trial courts deflected
potential individual issue problems by assuming that they could either solve
them later or, if not, decertify the class. 35 Thus, in Texas state court, "[i]f it
is not determinable from the outset that the individual issues can be
considered in a manageable, time-efficient, yet fair manner, then certification
is not appropriate."'' 3 6 Along those lines, the proposed amendments to Federal
Rule Civil Procedure 23 delete the existing reference to "conditional"
certification on the basis that "[a] court that is not satisfied that the
requirements of Rule 23 have been met should refuse certification until they
have been met. ' 1
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, has given no indication that it
intends to adopt any such requirement.'
Indeed, rather than place a heavy
burden on plaintiffs at certification, the court's longstanding practice has been
to give plaintiffs the benefit of the doubt, believing that the trial court can
modify the certification order if it turns out to have been ill advised. ' In that
same vein, the Oklahoma Supreme Court seems content to rely on the prospect
132. Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675,689 (Tex. 2002); see also S.W. Ref.
Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000).
133. See Schein, 102 S.W.3d at 689.
134. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d at 435.
135. See id. at 434-35.
136. Id. at 436.
137. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23 & advisory committee's note (Proposed 2003), availableat
http://www.uscourts.gov/rules/congress0303.html.
138. To date, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's only significant commentary regarding the
content of certification orders concerned the propriety of a "general order" denying class
certification. See KMC Leasing, Inc. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 2000 OK 51, 1 13, 9 P.3d
683, 688. Ultimately, the court concluded that the hearing transcript and record in fact
supported the trial court's conclusion that a surfeit of individual issues precluded a finding of
predominance. Id. 1 13, 9 P.3d at 689.
139. Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2003 OK 17, 1 5, No. 97,469, 2003 WL 437160,
at *2 (Feb. 25, 2003).
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that devices like subclasses and issue classes can resolve management
problems as they arise, rather than requiring trial courts to actually sketch out
in advance how they would be used and how doing so would impact
predominance and trial management.'4° As a result, it may appear to some that
Oklahoma follows the "certify
now and worry later" approach condemned by
4
the Texas Supreme Court.' '
Before concluding that Oklahoma's approach must signify a procertification bias, however, it is important to consider the role that standard
of review might be playing. Class certification orders are reviewed for an
abuse of discretion. 42 Unless the reviewing court characterizes the trial
judge's ruling as the product of legal error,143 the reviewing court must sustain
the trial court's certification ruling unless the trial judge could not have
rationally reached the decision under review.'" While the predominance
requirement must have some legal boundaries, 145 it is fundamentally a rule
directed at judicial economy and efficiency - concerns that the Oklahoma
Supreme Court seems strongly inclined to leave to the trial court's discretion:
The discretion granted to the trial court on the certification issue
leaves the decision as to what method of trial is most efficient
primarily to the court that is in the best position to determine the
facts of the case, to appreciate the consequences of alternative
140. See id. 21, 2003 WL 437160, at *6. I address the use of issue classes and subclasses
to resolve predominance problems in Part V.C. infra.
141. At the very least, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's class certification practices might be
seen as manifesting laissez-faire certification characteristics consistent with that label.
142. See Ysbrand, 15, 2003 WL 437160, at *2; KMC Leasing,1 10, 9 P.3d at 688.
143. Examples would include using the wrong certification standard, see Scoufos v. State
Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 2001 OK 113, 11, 41 P.3d 366, 367, or making a substantive error
regarding the content of the underlying claims, see Ysbrand, 1 18, 2003 WL 437160, at *5
(choice-of-law error led court to erroneously conclude that single law, rather than law of fiftyone states, would apply).
144. See Ysbrand, 15,2003 WL 437160, at *2 (defining abuse of discretion to mean when
"discretion is exercised to an end or purpose not justified by, and clearly against, reason and
evidence")(quoting Patel v. OMH Med. Ctr., Inc., 1999 OK 33, 20, 987 P.2d 1185, 1194);
KMC Leasing, '110, 9 P.3d at 688 ("An abuse of discretion occurs when a court has, 'based its
decision on an erroneous conclusion of law or where there is no rational basis in evidence for
the ruling.") (quoting Mann v. Reynolds, 46 F.3d 1055, 1062 (10th Cir. 1995)).
145. In Ysbrand, for example, the court did not remand after concluding that the law of fiftyone jurisdictions would apply to the fraud claim, but instead held that "[aipplying the law of
[fifty-one] jurisdictions to the fraud claim presents an overwhelming burden which would make
the class unmanageable and a class action determination of that claim inappropriate." Ysbrand,
118, 2003 WL 437160, at *5. In effect, the court concluded that it did not need to remand
because it would be an abuse of discretion for the trial court to find predominance, thereby
creating a tacit legal rule.
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methods of resolving the issues of the case and that is in the best
46
position to select the most efficient method for their resolution. 1
Thus, the Oklahoma Supreme Court's relatively lenient approach to
predominance may simply reflect its hesitance to involve itself in a matter it
sees as essentially one of case management.'47
Whether Oklahoma's deferential model of provisional certification stems
from the court's views on discretionary review, its underlying faith in the
ability of trial courts to deal with management problems as they arise, or
simply a lenient pro-certification view towards predominance, that model has
important consequences for the parties and their lawyers. The available
evidence indicates that most cases that are certified as class actions settle. 4 '
As one critic of provisional certification explains, "The stated premise of
provisional certification is that the court can always decertify later if the
[individual] issues complicate matters too much. But later never comes, and
never will, because the cases always settle first - as judges know better than
anyone."' 4 9 Thus, the most direct and powerful consequence of a permissive
certification framework is that it subjects more litigants to the peculiar
dynamics of class action settlement.
Whether this hurts or helps plaintiffs or defendants as a whole is hard to
say. The traditional view has been that class certification forces defendants
to pay tribute for claims with marginal merit to avoid the risk of "bet the
company" litigation. 50 It is also true, however, that class certification, by
conferring a type of limited monopoly on class counsel to sell global
preclusion and peace, 5 ' creates agency problems that might lead class counsel
to "embrace a settlement inadequate for all, many, or some class members in
146. KMC Leasing, 19,9 P.3d at 688 (quoting Boughton v. Cotter Corp., 65 F.3d 823, 826
(10th Cir. 1995)).
147. Even as a function of discretionary review, however, the court's willingness to place
faith in trial judges' abilities to make wise management decisions stands in stark contrast to the
Texas Supreme Court's insistence that even management issues be scrutinized for "actual, not
presumed, conformance with [Rule 23]." Henry Schein, Inc. v. Stromboe, 102 S.W.3d 675, 691
(Tex. 2002) (quoting S.W. Ref. Co. v. Bernal, 22 S.W.3d 425, 435 (Tex. 2000)).
148. See Thomas E. Willging et al., An EmpiricalAnalysis of Rule 23 to Address the Rulemaking Challenges, 71 N.Y.U. L. REV. 74, 180 (1996).
149. Kramer, supra note 30, at 565.
150. See In re Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, Inc., 51 F.3d 1293,1298-99 (7th Cir. 1995) (discussing
class action settlement pressures). But see Bruce Hay & David Rosenberg, "Sweetheart" and
"Blackmail'"Settlements in ClassActions: Reality andRemedy, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1377,
1378 (2000) (contending that the notion of blackmail settlements may be overstated).
151. See Richard A. Nagareda, The Preexistence Principle and the Structure of the Class
Action, 103 COLUM. L. REV. 149, 161 (2003); see also Rubenstein, supra note 91, at 419
(characterizing class actions as transactions in which rights to sue are bought and sold).
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exchange for the prospect of obtaining a fee award."' 2 Thus, class
certification can also create an opportunity for the defendant to buy
meritorious claims in bulk at an unwarranted discount.' One thing we can
say, though, is that the lawyers who seek class certification - for purposes
noble or otherwise - will gravitate towards those jurisdictions where
certification is more likely. Thus, a permissive class certification framework
subjects more litigants to the dynamics of class action settlement.in two ways:
first, by attracting more class actions; and, second, by granting certification
in a greater percentage of those cases.
C. Achieving PredominanceThrough Subclasses and Issue Classes
Oklahoma courts have founded their decisions to affirm class certification,
despite the presence of individual issues, in part on the ability of trial courts
to create subclasses and issue classes."S" While both devices are important in
modem class action litigation, it remains unclear how they intersect with the
section 2023(B)(3) predominance requirement.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has cited the ability to subclass as a way of

handling individual issues that might arise during the course of a class action.
Courts typically subclass for two reasons. First, subclassing may be necessary
to satisfy adequacy of representation because the full range of potential class
members, if grouped together, would have conflicting interests.'" Second,
subclassing can be a valuable management tool to overcome superiority
problems." 6 One example, discussed earlier, occurs when courts group the
152. Nagareda, supra note 151, at 163; see also HENSLER ET AL., supra note 66, at 79
(discussing temptation for class counsel to collude with defense counsel).
153. Perhaps the most notorious example of this is the so-called "coupon settlement," in
which class counsel receives a large attorneys' fee award while the class compensation consists
solely of coupons towards future purchases from the defendant. See Christopher R. Leslie, A
Market-Based Approach to Coupon Settlements in Antitrust and Consumer Class Action
Litigation, 49 UCLA L. REV. 991, 1041 (2002) ("[C]oupon settlements raise the specter of
unfaithful fiduciaries and of unsatisfactory settlements.").
154. See Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2003 OK 17, 21, No. 97,469, 2003 WL
437160, at *6 (Feb. 25, 2003).
155. See 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 23.05[2] (subclassing appropriate
when groups within proposed class have adverse interests); 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 2 1,
§ 1790, at 276 ("The usual situation in which a court will divide a class into subclasses under
Rule 23(c)(4)(B) is when the class is found to have members whose interests are divergent or
antagonistic."); see also, e.g., Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999) (subclassing
between present and future claimants required to eliminate conflict of interest); Amchem Prods.,
Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 626 (1997) (finding that class action "on behalf of giant class
rather than on behalfof a single discrete subclasses" resulted in intraclass conflicts undermining
the Rule 23(a)(4) requirement of adequacy of representation).
156. See In re St. Jude Med., Inc. Silzone Heart Valves Prods. Liab. Litig., No. MDL 01-

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003

OKLAHOMA LA W RE VIEW

[Vol. 56:289

laws of the different states into categories and then subclass according to those
groupings to make the class more manageable. 117 Whether it is used to resolve
conflicts of interest or management problems, the essence of the subclass is
that it sorts a large and superficially homogenous group into smaller groups
that more accurately reflect the differences between them. This can facilitate
predominance in the sense that the members of the subclass, having been
sorted according to a secondary common trait, now can claim one more thing
in common.' 58
Subclassing is inherently limited as a predominance tool, however, because
it has no effect on the need for individual issue adjudication. If the individual
class members need to prove an issue individually - reliance, for example subclassing does not change that. Even if the court could sort the class
members into groups based on various theories of reliance, each class member
in each group would still need to present individual proof of reliance. Indeed,
for truly individual issues, subclassing provides no help because each subclass - properly defined as to that issue - would consist of a single class
member.' 59 Second, subclassing has secondary consequences for certification.
Each subclass must independently satisfy the requirements for class
certification. 6 ° Thus, because each subclass needs to independently satisfy
numerosity, the idea that courts can use subclasses to isolate "problematic"

1396 JRT/FLN, 2003 WL 1589527, at * 10 (D. Minn. Mar. 27,2003) ("The Court finds that the
superiority requirement can be met, and certification granted under Rule 23(b)(3) to various
subclasses of the relevant causes of action."); see also 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, §
1790, at 283-84 (discussing use of subclasses to make class treatment manageable).
157. See supranote 30; see, e.g., In re Telectronics Pacing Sys., Inc., 172 F.R.D. 271,29394 (S.D. Ohio 1997) (accepting plaintiffs' proposed strict liability subclasses as both accurate
distillations of the substantive law and manageable litigation packages that meet the superiority
requirement).
158. From this perspective, it is perhaps most accurate to view subclassing as a technique
that takes a single group with one common issue and splits it into several smaller groups, each
with two or more common issues. In Ortiz v. Fibreboard, for example, the U.S. Supreme Court
held that the class of persons exposed to asbestos should have been subclassed, at minimum, to
separate class members with present injuries from those whose claims might arise in the future.
Ortiz, 527 U.S. at 856. The original class had the common issue of asbestos exposure; the
respective subclasses would have had the multiple common issues of exposure and injury status.
159. Relatedly, a court might create a subclass for all class members who appear to have
substantial individual issues. See, e.g., Smilow v. S.W. Bell Mobile Sys., Inc., 323 F.3d 32, 40
(1 st Cir. 2003) (suggesting the possibility of using subclasses to address the potential that some
class members may have statute of limitations problems). While doing so might repackage the
class action in a way that makes class treatment seem more manageable, it does not alter the fact
that each class member within that subclass may require individual proof, and therefore does
not alter the ultimate mix of common versus individual issues.
160. See 5 MooRE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, supra note 2, § 23.05[2].

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss2/15

2003]

CLASS CERTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 2023(B)(3)

323

class members is suspect. 6 ' Moreover, extensive subclassing can create
62
manageability problems that undermine the superiority requirement.
Therefore, a legitimate question exists as to whether the availability of
subclassing supports a deferential approach to predominance when substantial
individual issues appear to cloud the trial horizon.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court has also identified the issue class as a way
trial courts can deal with individual issue problems that might arise after
certification. 6' 3 Under section 2023(C)(4)(a), "[A]n action may be brought or
maintained as a class action with respect to particular issues."'"
The
Oklahoma Supreme Court, however, has not offered any specific insight on
how the issue class can solve individual issue problems. As discussed below,
the answer may depend on unresolved questions regarding the proper usage
of the issue class itself.
An examination of issue class usage under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
23(c)(4)(A) - after which section 2023(C)(4)(a) is modeled - both explains
what an issue class is and reveals an important case split regarding the usage
of issue classes to solve predominance problems. Under Rule (c)(4)(A), a
court may certify only certain issues for class treatment.'65 In a products
liability suit, for example, the trial court might certify the issue of product
defect for class treatment, but not certify the more individualized issues of
causation or damages. Typically, issue class certification is accompanied by
an order bifurcating the trial into stages, in which the parties litigate the
66
common issues first while reserving proof on individual issues for later.1
161. See KMC Leasing, Inc. v. Rockwell-Standard Corp., 2000 OK 51,1 18, 9 P.3d 683,
689 (finding that plaintiffs proposed subclasses failed numerosity); see also MANUAL FOR
COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD) § 30.15 (1995) ("If toomany subclasses are sought, some may
not contain enough members to satisfy the numerosity requirement.").
162. See In re Ford Motor Co. Ignition Switch Prods. Liab., 174 F.R.D. 332, 352 (D.N.J.
1997) (finding that the use of subclasses to account for differences in model, year, and
applicable law would cause the suit to "quickly devolve into an unmanageable morass of
divergent legal and factual issues"). According to one commentator, courts that advocate
subclassing based on groupings of laws may be miscalculating the management benefits by
dramatically underestimating the number of subclasses that might be required. See Coffee,
supra note 20, at 396 (describing a scenario where only a handful of variables would still
require eighteen subclasses); see also, e.g.,In re FordMotorCo., 174 F.R.D. at 352 (calculating
that subclassing might require as many as 8000 subclasses).
163. See Ysbrand v. DaimlerChrysler Corp., 2003 OK 17, 21, No. 97,469, 2003 WL
437160, at *6 (Feb. 25, 2003).
164. 12 OKLA. STAT. § 2023(C)(4)(a) (2001); see also FED. R. Clv. P. 23(c)(4)(A).
165. See MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION (THIRD), supra note 161, § 30.17 ("[A] class
may be certified for only certain issues or claims in the litigation."); 7B WRIGHT ET AL,
supra note 21, § 1790, at 271-74 (describing types of issue classes that have been certified).
166. See FED. R. Civ. P. 42(b) (authorizing bifurcated trials); see also Laura J. Hines,

Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2003

OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 56:289

Assuming that the class members prevailed on their common issues, they
would then split up for the ultimate disposition of their claims. 167 The named
plaintiffs would proceed to final judgment in that court. The absent class
members, however, would no longer have a case pending before that court; to
obtain a final judgment, they would need to pursue individual suits using the
68
classwide ruling for its preclusive effect.
While the courts and commentators agree that (c)(4)(A) supports the
certification of issue classes, they disagree on the relationship between it and
the (b)(3) predominance requirement. Some courts evaluate predominance in
69
an issue class solely with respect to the part of the case that is classed.
Challengingthe Issue Class Action End-Run, 52 EMORY L.J. (forthcoming 2003) (discussing
phased issue classes); Jon Romberg, Haifa Loaf isPredominantand Superiorto None: Class
CertificationofParticularIssues underRule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 UTAH L. REV. 249, 265 (same).
The benefits of bifurcating an issue class would be the same as with bifurcation of simple
litigation under Federal Rule 42(b) - judicial efficiency and improved comprehension. The
efficiency gains stem from the chance that the trial will end after the first phase, either because
of a defense win or because the phase one verdict leads the parties to settle. See Steven S.
Gensler, Bifurcation Unbound, 75 WASH. L. REV. 705, 772 (2000). The comprehension
benefits flow from the fact that the jury will be able to focus on the particular issue at hand,
rather than try to recall, sift through, and assess evidence on all of the issues of the case at the
same time. See id. at 751.
167. See Simon v. Philip Morris Inc., 200 F.R.D. 21, 29-30 (E.D.N.Y. 2001) (discussing
mechanics of issue class utilizing separatejuries). Later in Simon, Judge Weinstein summarized
the proposed issue class proceedings as follows:
If the jury returns a verdict favorable to the defendants the case will come to a
sudden stop. In the event of an affirmative verdict on the common issue of general
compensatory liability, the individual compensation claims of each class member
not decided in [the] court would then be transferred to appropriate federal district
courts throughout the country for decisions on such issues as individual causation,
individual damages and individual statutes of limitations defenses.
Id. at 50; see also Romberg, supra note 166, at 262 (discussing stages and proceedings when
court employs an issue class).
168. See In re Am. Honda Motor Co. Dealer Relations Litig., 979 F. Supp. 365, 366,368-69
(D. Md. 1997).
169. See, e.g., Valentino v. Carter-Wallace, Inc., 97 F.3d 1227, 1234 (9th Cir. 1996) ("Even
if the common questions do not predominate over the individual questions so that class
certification... is warranted, Rule 23 authorizes the district court in appropriate cases to isolate
the common issues under Rule 23(c)(4)(A) and proceed with class treatment of these particular
issues."); Simon, 200 F.R.D. at 29-30 (examining the history and policy of issue classes and
concluding that the court could assess predominance on an issue-by-issue basis). This view
finds substantial support in the leading treatises. See 2 CONTE & NEWBERG, supra note 3, §
4:23; 7A WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 1778, at 546 (advocating use of issue classes where
common issues do not predominate overall because "[tihe effect may be to make the common
issues in the recast class action 'predominate' for purposes of Rule 23(b)(3)); 7B WRIGHT ET
AL., supra note 21, § 1790.

https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol56/iss2/15

2003]

CLASS CERTIFICATION UNDER SECTION 2023(B)(3)

325

From that vantage point, however, the common issue will always predominate
because those are the only issues that are part of the calculus - all of the
individual issues are set apart for later individual adjudication. "0 For this
reason, other courts have rejected that approach as an end run around
predominance.'7 1 Rather, they hold that an issue class may be certified only
if the common issues predominate over individual issues for the dispute as a
whole package, including the individual issues that the absent class members
2
will have resolved in other suits.
At this time, no published Oklahoma decision has discussed the relationship
between section 2023(B)(3) predominance and section 2023(C)(4)(a) issue
classes under Oklahoma's class action rule. How section (C)(4)(a) is
interpreted, however, will greatly impact the propriety of invoking it at the
class certification stage. On the one hand, Oklahoma might follow the view
articulated by the Ninth Circuit and Judge Weinstein that, when an issue class
is proposed, predominance is measured solely in relation to the issues that are
proposed for class treatment. If this is the case, then it would be logically
valid to conditionally certify problematic class actions in reliance on section
(C)(4)(a) because the court could manufacture predominance at any time by
limiting the scope of classwide treatment to include only those issues that turn
out to be amenable to classwide proof.' On the other hand, Oklahoma might
follow the Fifth Circuit and hold that predominance must be measured against
all issues in the dispute, regardless of whether they are to be classed. In that
case, it would be inappropriate to rely on the possibility of creating issue
classes - either at the time of the certification hearing or later in the suit -

170. See 2 CONTE&NEWBERG, supra note 3, § 4:23 ("When a court decides to limit a class
action . . . to particular common issues only, such limitation will necessarily afford
predominance as to those issues."); Romberg, supra note 166, at 289 ("For many years
following the 1966 amendments to Rule 23, the dominant (if relatively unexplored) position of
courts and commentators was that certifying only the common issues in a case automatically
resulted in predominance .... ").
171. See, e.g., Castano v. Am. Tobacco Co., 84 F.3d 734, 745 n.21 (5th Cir. 1996) ("A
district court cannot manufacture predominance through the nimble use of subdivision (c)(4).
The proper interpretation of the interaction between subdivisions (b)(3) and (c)(4) is that acause
of action, as a whole, must satisfy the predominance requirement of (b)(3) .. "); Arch v. Am.
Tobacco Co., 175 F.R.D. 469,496 (E.D. Pa. 1997) ("Plaintiffs cannot read the predominance
requirement out of (b)(3) by using (c)(4) to sever issues until the common issues predominate
over the individual issues."), aftd, 161 F.3d 127 (3d Cir. 1998).
172. For a comprehensive survey of how the federal courts have interpreted Federal Rule 23
(c)(4) during the last several years, see Hines, supra note 166, Part Ill.C.
173. See Hannah Stott-Bumsted, Note, Severance Packages:Judicial Use of FederalRule
of Civil Procedure23(c)(4)(A), 91 GEO. L.J. 219, 235 (2002) (discussing intersection of (c)(1)
conditional certification and (c)(4)(A) issue classes).
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since any such issue classes would have no bearing on whether the common
issues predominated over the individual issues in the dispute as a whole.' 74
VI. Conclusion
Class action critics complain that, under current practice, class plaintiffs
shop to find the state courts with the least demanding certification
standards. 7 5 At this point, Oklahoma can be viewed as a less demanding
jurisdiction, as least insofar as it has declined to follow the trend towards
erecting barriers to satisfying the predominance requirement. As detailed
above, Oklahoma's treatment of choice of law, the impact of individual issues,
and certification metholdology all tend to preserve the possibility of class
certification rather than to foreclose it.
This is not to say that Oklahoma courts must protect the state's borders
from forum-shopping plaintiffs by adopting more stringent certification
standards. Oklahoma courts should adopt certification standards that best
implement Oklahoma class action policy, whatever it might be. It is
nevertheless important to recognize that, in our federal system, policy choices
can have forum-shopping consequences. And in this case, the cumulative
effect of Oklahoma case law under section 2023(B)(3) may well be to make
Oklahoma a more desirable forum for national state law class action litigation.

174. As with subclasses, however, the use of issue classes can be relevant to (b)(3)'s
superiority requirement. See 7B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 21, § 1790, at 268-69 (discussing
use of issue classes to solve manageability problems that otherwise might prevent class
treatment from being superior to the litigation alternatives).
175. See Beisner & Miller, supra note 66, at 155. Pending legislation would amend the
diversity statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1332, to confer federal subject matter jurisdiction over state law
class actions based on minimal diversity and the aggregate amount in controversy. See Class
Action Fairness Act of 2003, H.R. 1115, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003); Class Action Fairness of Act
of 2003, S. 274, 108th Cong. § 4 (2003). This legislation, should it pass, would mitigate the
impact of class action procedure differences among the states because more class actions could
be filed in (or, more likely, removed to) federal court, where certification would be governed
by Federal Rule 23.
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